Democracy promotion and Western aid to Africa: Lessons from Ethiopia (1991-2012)

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Abstract
Since the end of the Cold War, Western donors have been following a strategy of democracy promotion to Africa that involves giving assistance to both the state and the non-state actors including governments (as part of good governance program), parliaments, courts, political parties, civil society, electoral management bodies, election observation missions etc. The paper explores both the positive and the negative impacts of such assistance to African emerging democracies by using Ethiopia as a case study. The paper primarily deals with three sub-sectors of democracy promotion program: assistances to political parties, international election observation missions, and civil society. In this study, I argue that human rights and self interest (economic, political or both) shape the foreign aid policy of Western donors including democracy assistance. Moreover, the paper attempts to prove that democratic reversals or backsliding and human rights abuses in the recipient states can trigger aid reduction or termination only when the recipient states are neither economically nor strategically valuable to the Western donors.

Keywords: Africa, civil society, democracy assistance, Ethiopia, foreign aid, international election observation, political party, Western donors.

1. Introduction
Following WWII, the United States introduced the Marshal Plan and attempted to use economic aid to shape the politics of the recipient countries (European countries) whose economy was devastated by the war. During the Cold War, both the Western and the Eastern camps had used economic aid to buy allies that would increase their sphere of influences. In this period, Western donors followed such policy in Africa, Asia and Latin America with the aim of curbing the spread of Communism by allocating aid. Therefore, foreign aid had been politicized and its flow was largely to developing countries which had political and strategic importance to donor countries. As
Nielson and Nielson (2008) argued, from the beginning foreign aid by Western donors has been used to recruit political allies. The end of the Cold War in the 2nd half of the 1980s heralded a new era. This time, Western aid principally aimed at promoting democracy in emerging democracies. Democracy promotion as part of foreign aid\(^1\) (Ranker and Menocal 2007: 1) became a new approach based on the belief that democracies are more peaceful and better economic partners (Nielson and Nielson 2008). In this scheme, Western donors engaged themselves in providing aid for the promotion of democracy in emerging democracies (McMahon 2002).\(^2\) In the State of the Union Address in 1995, President Bill Clinton said “ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere” (Steele and Scott 2005). According to Lundy (2004), the major ingredients of the American democracy support include free and fair elections, human rights protection, and the separation of the military from the executive branch of government. After the fall of Communism, respect for civil and political human rights has become the cornerstone of the democratization process in the emerging democracies and it has been one of the fundamental criteria to get aid from the Western established democracies. Since the first half of 1990s, donor countries of the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) also decided good governance including human rights as a guide to their foreign aid allocation. Earlier, i.e. during the Cold War, good governance and human rights were given less consideration in aid allocations.

According to Siegle (2007: 5), democracy promotion aid has grown twenty-fold since 1990. In the last decade, Western donors have dramatically increased the amount of aid for democracy promotion and the largest democracy assistance provider (in a country level) was the United States. The USAID budgeted $637 million for democracy assistance in fiscal year 1999 of which $123 million was for Sub-Saharan Africa (Carothers 1999: 49, 51). In 2000, the US funding on democracy was 800 million dollars and it reached 1.4 billion dollars in 2005 (Mathieson and Young 2006: 1). At the turn of the millennium it is estimated that roughly $ 2 billion per year was allocated for democracy promotion around the world. At present, the European Union offers over $1 billion and the United States annually provides around $850 million for democracy promotion.\(^3\) From European countries, the largest provider is Germany\(^4\) (Carothers 2004: 2; Youngs 2006). In 2004, Germany provided 200 million Euros (Ranker and Menocal 2007: 1). The major recipient of European democracy funding is Sub-Saharan Africa (Youngs 2008b 162). Africa received 40% of Danish political aid between 2000 and 2006 (Young 2008b:163). In 2004, Francophone African
countries received 86% of French governance aid. Africa also received 121 million euros from Sweden (i.e. democratic governance and human rights assistance) in 2007 (Youngs 2008b:163-164).

Though, most of the time, direct democracy aid is funded bilaterally, international financial institutions like the World Bank, and the IMF also fund projects intended to promote good governance despite their charters that require them to be politically neutral.

The paper attempts to address the following core questions:
(a) Did democracy assistance bring the required change in Africa?
(b) Why do Western donors continue their support to the TPLF-EPRDF government of Ethiopia despite its very bad human rights records and its role in hindering the country’s democratization process?
(c) How does the Ethiopian government use the anti-terrorism campaigns as a cover to persecute its local opponents?

2. Sub-Sectors of Democracy Assistance

Western donors’ democracy aid to African transitional democracies has many sub-sectors. The major ones include assistance to political parties, electoral management bodies (i.e. for the training of election administrators), local election observers (e.g. election-related training), international election monitors, and civil society (i.e. support to NGOs/CSOs, media and labor unions, business associations, women organizations, civic education groups etc.) (de Zeeuv 2004: 6; Rakner and Menocal 2007). The major forms of democracy assistance include elections and electoral processes (i.e. support and advice on electoral systems, laws and regulations, assistance to establish legal electoral frameworks, support for electoral procedures such as party and voter registration, balloting, vote counting and dispute resolution), and judicial reform support. In the following sections, I will deal with Western donors’ democracy assistance to political parties, international election observation missions, and civil society in Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular.

2.1. Democracy Assistance to Political Parties

For Caton (2007: 6), party assistance is “any type of international assistance geared towards individual parties or the party system as a whole, with the purpose of strengthening democracy in a given country.” Political party assistance may include supporting parties to build or strengthen basic party organization in the areas of membership, grassroots outreach, developing political platforms, building internal democracy and gender diversity; assisting parties to increase capacity and encouraging them in electoral campaigning, voter mobilization, candidate selection and training, fundraising and media
work, promoting inter-party dialogue and cooperation at both the regional and the national levels; encouraging stronger linkages between political parties and civil society, financial support etc.

Election campaigns in Africa are very expensive due to the low income of many Africans, high illiteracy rate, low technological development, large rural population (usually living in sporadic villages), low level infrastructure such as poor roads, archaic telecommunications and transport. All these factors add heavy burden on political parties (Saffu 2003: 2). Especially, the extreme poverty in Africa has put many political parties in a very serious situation threatening their chance of receiving sufficient contributions (donations) from local supporters. In developed democracies, public funding may be sufficient to cover all the expense of political parties. However, in African emerging democracies, public funding is either non-existent or meager. As the result, political parties are compelled to look for funds from other sources including party assistance from donor countries (Tshitereke 2002). In addition, the high cost of elections and their ambition to have high quality elections made Sub-Saharan African emerging democracies to be donor dependent (Rakner and Svasand 2002: 9).

When we examine the role of donor countries in democratizing Africa, it is obvious that there is a shift in the donors’ behavior from the previous non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries to that of support for democracy and human rights. The major emphasis of donor countries in the African democratization process rests on the elections. In the early years of Western democracy aid to Africa, there were attempts to give direct financial donations to African political parties. However, soon, controversies erupted and still now there are problems for political parties receiving foreign aid. In some African countries, there are laws and regulations to control political parties’ fund raising because it is believed that the absence of such regulations might lead political parties to be controlled by foreign donors. It is true, some times, foreign funding might be counter-productive. In the past, there were many allegations against opposition parties by the incumbents due to foreign funding and how the funding was used. There were also many attempts to portray opposition parties as tools of foreign governments. Therefore, for African political parties foreign funding could be disadvantageous and sometimes might have disastrous effects (Wondwosen 2009e: 119-132).

As I stated above, in many African countries, foreign funding is usually prohibited due to its risk to their national security. According to Pinto-Duschinsky (2002: 74), almost half of the 104 countries he studied have regulations that ban foreign donations. It is feared that through donations foreign
countries and organizations might influence the recipient countries’ domestic policies. Moreover, foreign influences through donations (particularly from those foreign elements that do not have voting rights) are not allowed. According to Amundsen (2007: 5), Western donors’ support to political parties could bring negative outcomes, namely, intervention problems, increasing fragmentation of political parties and polarization among parties, and so on.

Realizing these risks foreign donors are no more willing to give direct assistance to African political parties. Instead, they have decided to give their assistance indirectly. Indirect assistance includes: building the capacity of electoral management bodies (i.e. by offering technical support, seminar, training, travel grants, material and financial support with the goal of improving conditions to hold “free and fair election”), sending international election observers (see Wondwosen 2008b: 119-137), supporting civil society (Wondwosen 2009a: 80-95), etc. According to Boneo and Dahl (2006: 20), indirect support given by Western donors has “fundamental importance for the countries where political parties cannot attract substantial funding.”

To sum up, for opposition political parties in Africa receiving a financial support from Western donors has the following disadvantages: First and foremost, in emerging democracies foreign funding is viewed as an attempt by external forces to influence the outcome of national elections and the directions of political parties. In this case, foreign funding is regarded as something that violates the basic principle of democracy, i.e., “The election of representatives should express the political preferences of the politically enfranchised citizens” (Mathisen and Svasand 2002: 18).

Second, political parties’ dependence on external funding might limit or decrease their attachment with the electorate. In other words, political parties’ connection with the electorate would be less as long as political parties depend on foreign aid (Mathisen and Svasand 2002: 18). When political parties’ connection with the electorate decreases, they no longer reflect the view of the electorate because party leaders start to live comfortable life thanks to the foreign aid.

Third, party leaders could be turned into authoritarian practices and might follow a monolithic leadership. Furthermore, they could be less and less tolerant to criticisms from fellow party members fearing the exposure of their corrupt practices.

Fourth, foreign funding might also lead to the formation of the so-called “party entrepreneurs”—individuals who establish political parties to tap internationally available funds (Mathisen and
Svasand 2002: 18). Therefore, many ambitious individuals would be encouraged to establish political parties as a short cut for rapid personal wealth. This condition could lead to further fragmentation of political parties—a development hardly conducive to democratic consolidation.

Though, as we have seen above, many observers have criticized foreign funding as both unethical and counterproductive, there are also arguments that have supported foreign funding to political parties. According to the advocates of this argument, foreign funding for opposition parties is necessary to counter the domination of the incumbents. Moreover, though ideally political parties should develop and depend on local resources, the absolute poverty in Africa does not allow political parties to entirely depend on national resources (Wondwosen 2009e:119-132). After considering both sides of the arguments we can say that if democracy is to be entrenched in Africa (in principle) it needs to be strengthened from within. Foreign funding might be necessary, but it should not be tainted and should not try to impose models from outside. Moreover, it has to support the national processes (Mathisen and Svasand 2002: 21). As recommended by Amundsen (2007: 7-8), instead of giving direct financial support to political parties Western donors should give democracy aid indirectly to assist reforms in constitutional and legal frameworks, electoral commissions, election observation missions (both local and international), parliaments, local governments, media, and civil society.

2.1.1. Party Assistance Models of Western Donors

According to Mathisen and Svasand (2002), there are five major Western donor countries that offer support to political parties in emerging democracies. These are Germany, the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden.

(A) Germany

Various foundations which are associated with German political parties offer political assistance to developing countries (Hearn 1999: 10; Mathisen and Svasand 2002). These are: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FNS), Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (HSS), and Heinrich-Boll-Stiftung (HBS). These Stiftungen (foundations) originally were aimed at providing civic education to the German people. Later on, however, they started to expand their activities abroad. These foundations get funds for their international activities from the German government, and they have full independence in the allocation of the funds. At present, the foundations conduct their activities in more than hundred countries and the biggest recipient African country is South Africa. For instance, the Konrad Adenauer foundation used to support the Inkatha party of South Africa since the 1980s, while the Friedrich Ebert Foundation
supported the ANC. On the other hand, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation supported the liberal community, and organizations like the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) and the Helen Suzman Foundation. The other recipient African country was Uganda. Both Konrad Adenauer Foundation and Friedrich Ebert Foundation had been supporting Uganda since 1987. The Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) received support from the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, while the Democratic Party (DP) of Uganda received support from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Hearn 1999: 10). In their activities in developing countries, which had been going on for three or more decades, these German foundations were criticized for their co-operation with authoritarian and single party regimes. Therefore, due to these constant criticisms the foundations stopped supporting political parties in developing countries, but increased their support to civic societies, advocacy groups, media, political think tanks, parliaments, and electoral management bodies (Mathisen and Svasand 2002).

(B) The United States

The American support for new democracies is conducted largely by two organizations: the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) (Carlson n.d: 1-20; Carothers 2004: 14-15). Both NDI and IRI are getting fund from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the USAID (USAID 1999). In comparison, the NDI works more broadly than the IRI that works only in few countries that are strategically important to the U.S national foreign policy interests (USAID 1999: 17). When we compare both the NDI and the IRI with German Stiftungs, we find out that both American organizations are less autonomous than their German counterparts, and their programs are always expected to adhere to the US government’s guidelines. The two American foundations support and conduct projects on elections, civic education, parliaments, and political party capacity buildings. Their support to political parties in capacity building usually includes the training of party MPs, technical assistance for party building and election-related issues etc (Mathisen and Svasand 2002). The two American organizations sometimes are accused of being interventionist and partisan. For instance, Ethiopia expelled the NDI and IRI, and another American organization, IFES⁹, from the country in the 2005 Parliamentary election. The Ethiopian government told the organizations to leave the country with in 48 hours due to their “failure to register” properly (Wondwosen 2008b: 119-137).

(C) Britain

Since 1992, the UK Westminster Foundation (WF) has been supporting the building of pluralistic democratic institutions overseas. The foundation has been active in East and Central Europe and in
Anglophone African countries. The foundation is not affiliated with any particular party and it attempts to have a neutral role in the democracy promotion assistance. It gives technical assistance to electoral processes, supports the independent media, trade unions, political NGOs, parliaments and political parties. The foundation gets its fund from the British government (Mathisen and Svasand 2002). According to Mathisen and Svasand (2002), British political parties also offer technical and budget support to political parties in developing countries. The technical assistance involves training, election campaigning, party management, and support for think-tanks while the budgetary assistance involves the funding of party capacity building activities.

(D) The Netherlands
The Dutch foundation for the new South Africa (NZA) was established to assist post-apartheid South Africa’s stability. The foundation was supported by all Dutch political parties in the parliament, except the extreme right party. In 2000, NZA was replaced by the Netherlands Institute for Multi-party Democracy (IMD). The new foundation is attempting to expand its activity in Latin America and Asia, and in few African countries such as Mozambique (Mathisen and Svasand 2002).

(E) Sweden
Seven Swedish foundations closely aligned with Swedish political parties have started to support “sister parties” in developing countries, and East and Central Europe since 1995 (SIDA 2002: 11). Their aim is to develop pluralistic party systems in the new democracies (Mathisen and Svasand 2002). Their support includes both technical and budgetary assistances to political parties. African countries such as Mozambique, Tanzania, and Ethiopia have been the beneficiaries of such support (SIDA 2002: 12).

2.1.2. Democracy Assistance to Ethiopian Political Parties during the 2005 Election
In the 2005 election, as part of democracy assistance programs, Western donors offered financial/material assistance to Ethiopian political parties that participated in the election. In this election, many opposition parties, the incumbent party, and independent candidates received indirect funding (i.e. non-cash support in goods and services) for their election campaigns from the international donors. The coordinator of this funding program was the Electoral Reform International Services (ERIS). ERIS received the fund from the international donors through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). According to the cash-value allocation formula, every political party/coalition received 3,460 Birr per candidate (i.e. a maximum of 259,000 Birr for 75 candidates). Furthermore, each political party or coalition that contested in two or more regions
(with more than one candidate in each region) received a cash-value allocation of 43,250 Birr per region it contested. In order to encourage the participation of women, each political party or coalition fielding a woman candidate received a cash value allocation of 2,160 Birr (250 USD) per woman candidate. Each independent candidate received a cash-value allocation of 3,460 Birr for printing services. In general, in the 2005 election, each political party was entitled to receive a maximum of 30,000 USD (i.e. 400USD for a single candidate) in the federal election. ERIS also supplied additional 5000 USD (for each region) for political parties contesting in two or more regions. All in all, ERIS offered 515,150 USD to political parties and independent candidates in the May 2005 election: the EPRDF received USD 88,750 (17%), CUD 71,000 USD (14%), UEDF (United Ethiopian Democratic Forces) 47,500 USD (9%); OFDM (Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement) 34,150 USD (7%), independents 141,200 USD (27%), and other small parties 132,300 USD (26%). Furthermore, in the election of the Somali region, which was held separately due to security reasons, ERIS distributed material assistance to the Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP), the Western Somali Democratic Party (WSDP), the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), the Dil Wabi People’s Democratic Movement (DWPDM), the Somali Democratic Alliance Force (SDAF), and the All Ethiopian National Movement (AENM) (The Ethiopian Herald 26 July 2005; 18 August 2005).
Table-1: Support to Political Parties, Coalitions and Independent Candidates in the 2005 Federal and Regional Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Recipient Political Party/Coalition</th>
<th>Total Cash-Value Allocation (ETB)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Independent Candidates</td>
<td>1,266,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)</strong></td>
<td>767,685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD)</strong></td>
<td>614,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF)</strong></td>
<td>410,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM)</strong></td>
<td>295,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Ethiopian Democratic Party</strong></td>
<td>192,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geda System Advancement Party</strong></td>
<td>151,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sheko and Mezenger People’s Democratic Unity Organization</strong></td>
<td>129,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oromia Liberation National Party</strong></td>
<td>121,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tigri Worgi Nationality Democratic Unity Party</strong></td>
<td>73,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sidama Liberation Movement</strong></td>
<td>67,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sidama Hadicho People’s Democratic Organization</strong></td>
<td>67,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethiopian Pan Africanist Party</strong></td>
<td>61,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oromo Liberation Unity Front</strong></td>
<td>52,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oromo Abbo Liberation Front</strong></td>
<td>38,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wolayata People’s Democratic Front</strong></td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afar National Democratic Party</strong></td>
<td>29,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front</strong></td>
<td>29,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benishangul-Gumuz Peoples’ Democratic Unity Front</strong></td>
<td>24,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gambela People’s Democratic Movement</strong></td>
<td>10,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethiopian National Unity Party</strong></td>
<td>10,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afar Liberation Front Party</strong></td>
<td>6,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Denta, Dehamo, Kitchenchla Democratic Organization</strong></td>
<td>6,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unity of Southern Ethiopia Democratic Forces</strong></td>
<td>6,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Harari People Democratic Party</strong></td>
<td>6,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gamo Democratic Union</strong></td>
<td>6,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Argoba Nationality Democratic Organization</strong></td>
<td>6,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Argoba People’s Democratic Movement</strong></td>
<td>3,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethiopian Social Democratic Movement</strong></td>
<td>3,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gedeo People’s Democratic Organization</strong></td>
<td>3,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Somali Peoples’ Democratic Party</strong></td>
<td>3,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Harer National League</strong></td>
<td>3,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethiopians’ Unity Democratic Organization</strong></td>
<td>3,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>3,242,870</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NEBE (National Electoral Board of Ethiopia)
2.2. Democracy Assistance to Election Observation Missions

One of the sub-sectors of Western donor’s democracy promotion aid to emerging democracies is the support given to election observers (local and international). In 2005, for instance, electoral observation accounted for 12% of the EU funding. In the same year, EU election observation missions were sent to Afghanistan, Burundi, Ethiopia, Haiti, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Guinea Bissau, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Venezuela (Kausch et al. 2006: 67). Most of the time, the presence of international election observers serves as a “green light” for opposition parties to participate in the election with the hope that the election will be free and fair (Hyde and Beaulieu 2004: 5).

According to the UN (2005: 1), international election observation conveys the interests of the international community for the rule of law, respect of human rights, and for the general achievement of democratic elections. In principle, international election monitors should be free from any of multilateral and bilateral considerations that compromise their neutrality, and have to concentrate in the civil and political rights. In practice, however, international election observers’ analysis of an election is influenced by the objectives of the observing government or organization, and the particular goal of the election. International election monitors examine human rights and the general political situation very closely in countries that are in the early stage of building a democratic system than in the countries that have completed the transition stage of building democracy (IDEA 1999: 4). However, some times, as Geisler (1993) notes, cited by Brown (2005: 186), “Expecting little of African democracies, donors express satisfaction with elections that are clearly not ‘free and fair’”. Moreover, as Brown (2005: 186) indicates, “Often, bilateral donors knowingly endorse severely flawed elections and even prevent measures that will lay the foundation for future democratization”.

In Ethiopia, during the reign of Haile Selassie (1930-1974) and the Derg administration (1974-1991) international election monitors were not allowed (Dessalegn and Mehret 2004, 27). After the coming to power of the TPLF-EPRDF international election observers were allowed to observe elections in the country. In the June 21, 1992 regional and Woreda elections, by the invitation of the National Election Commission (NEC) more than 200 international observers from 23 countries came to Ethiopia for the first time to observe the election (NDIA and AAI 1992). For instance, the African-American Institute (AAI), a private voluntary organization, sponsored more than 70 observers out of more than 200 members of the JIOG (Joint International Observer Group). In the 2000 parliamentary election, the Ethiopian government refused to allow international observers to monitor the election. This action had brought strong local and international criticisms against the ruling party (TPLF-EPRDF) (Reuters 02 May 2005).
In the 2005 election, however, the government decided to invite international observers after hesitating for some time. To facilitate the monitoring process, the NEBE (National Election Board of Ethiopia) formulated a Code of Conduct for the international election observers. According to the Code of Conduct (issued on February 25, 2005), the international election observers got the right to access election officials at all levels; observe polling and counting stations and venues; participate in the meetings called by the NEBE Secretariat in relation to election; attend election campaign rallies of political parties; and report any election-related irregularities to the election observers (at the polling stations and counting venues), and to the NEBE. The obligations of the international election observers, according to the Code of Conduct include: (a) Respecting the country’s sovereignty, the national laws and regulations, and the cultures of the people (b) Follow lawful instructions of the elections officers and security personnel (c) Never giving instructions, and show respect and courtesy to elections officers (d) Being impartial and not showing or wearing any partisan symbols and banners (e) Not carry weapon (NEBE 25 February 2005).

The major international election monitors in the 2005 parliamentary election in Ethiopia were the Carter Center, the European Union, and the African Union. As Pereira (2006:ii) pointed out, the conclusions of the election reports of the EU-EOM (European Union Election Observation Mission), and the Carter Center in the 2005 election concerning the validity of the electoral process were totally different from each other. The major cause for this discrepancy was their difference in the conceptualization of “free and fair” electoral practices. At present, there is an intense debate regarding “one voice” versus “pluralism” or “harmonization” of election monitoring reports and activities. Some scholars argue for “once voice” concept indicating that if various groups of international election monitors coordinate their activities and speak with one voice, electoral autocrats will not get a chance to cover their electoral manipulation. This is because, as observed in many elections in various countries, electoral autocrats cleverly exploit the differences among the election reports of the international election observers. Therefore, if the election monitors speak with a unified voice, it will deprive the electoral autocrats of “the ability to point to differing characterizations of an election by international monitors” (Merloe1999). On the other hand, however, forcing all international election monitors to issue similar election statements has its own shortcomings: First of all, this attempt might encourage the incumbents to invite only friendly monitors in order to ensure positive statements. Second, in the process, international monitors from NGOs might be overshadowed by big regional organizations and their voices might be silenced (Merloe 1999). Therefore, the release of international monitors’ election reports sometimes with diverse contents should not be considered as a weakness. To sum up, as asserted by Merloe
2.3. Democracy Assistance to Civil Society

Many scholars (Edwards and Hulme 1995; Jenkins 2001; Howell and Pearce 2001; Foley and Edwards 1996; Van Rooy 1998) have examined and debated the impacts of democracy promotion aid to civil society. Democracy promotion assistance to civil society may involve various forms: capacity-building assistance; and grants channeled through in-country missions or intermediaries (i.e. international NGOs, political foundations, churches, trade unions etc.) for advocacy work, projects, organizational development, research documentation, trainings, and workshops. The growing obstacles to Western democracy assistance to civil society at present include “the emergence of semi-authoritarian hybrid regimes characterized by superficially democratic process that disguise and help legitimate authoritarian rule” (NED 2006: 2) and recipient governments’ hostile policies such as introducing legal constraints on NGOs, conducting extra-legal forms of harassment on stakeholders etc. (NED 2006: 2). Dictatorial governments have been trying to hamper democracy aid to NGOs by taking measures such as putting restrictions on foreign funding and domestic financing, impediments to registration and denial of legal status etc. (NED 2006). Alarmed by the “color revolutions” which were largely facilitated by civil society organizations in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, authoritarian governments and electoral autocrats have tightened controls on the international NGOs. They have also upgraded censorship techniques on the NGOs by adopting the Chinese latest internet monitoring and control technology (NED 2006: 7).

As I have already discussed, due to civil society’s potential role in democratizing Africa, Western donors have shifted their emphasis from political parties to civil society organizations (Robinson and Friedman 2005:1). This shift is due to the fact that elections have become very controversial in Sub-Saharan Africa; and the involvement of Western donors in the elections by funding political institutions has provoked the recipient governments. Civil society groups that are mostly selected for Western democracy aid are advocacy NGOs such as human rights groups and election monitoring organizations (Carothers 1997: 114; Hearn 1999: 2). According to Robinson and Friedman (2005: 1), the most favored recipient civil society organizations by the donor countries are the ones that are involved in activities “designed to increase government accountability, broaden participation in public life and influence state policy”. Dessalegn (2002: 103) argues that the donor...
community encourages and strengthens voluntary institutions “in the belief that the road to democracy in Africa lies not in revolutions and class struggle but in the active involvement of civil society in the political process”.

The relationships between the state and civil society in developing countries are very complex than the situation in industrial counties (Ottaway 2005: 130). In developing countries, “Many governments see civil society organizations as dangerous enemies to be tightly controlled” (Ottaway 2005: 131). At present, many Western governments and foundations are increasingly “channeling funds for service provision, development projects, and humanitarian relief through NGOs” (Florini 2000). The preference given by Western donor countries to the CSOs/NGOs in the distribution and allocation of financial and material aids rather than the governments has created resentment among governments in developing countries (see Carapico 2002; Carothers and Ottaway 2000). As Clayton et al (2000:2) noted, when the Cold War ended, Western donors started to enforce good governance in developing countries by attaching certain preconditions in return for economic aid: the respect of human rights, the conduct of multi-party elections, and the reformation of state bureaucracies. The flourishing of civil society organizations in the 1990s was very important in the realization of this plan. According to TI Source Book (2000: 129), in the past, under the guise of state sovereignty power was monopolized by the states. At present, that authority is in decline and power is also claimed by civil society and the globalized business. Therefore, “Civil society is frequently challenging the governments’ legitimacy to speak on behalf of the people, and is frequently being used to channel development aid in ways that bypass their officials” (TI Source Book 2000: 129).

Since 1990s, Western governments’ interest in funding civil society organizations in Africa has highly increased, and to a certain extent this assistance has bolstered the continent’s democratization process (Hearn 1999: 2). Though, in principle, as Chazan (1992: 282) notes, “The nurturing of civil society is widely perceived as the most effective means of controlling repeated abuses of state power, holding rulers accountable to their citizens and establishing the foundations of durable democracy” (cited by Okuku 2002: 83), the current picture in many African countries is not encouraging. Civil society groups in Africa have many weaknesses that limited their participation in the democratization process. First, they lack internal democracy, i.e. their own members are not socialized with democratic principles let alone democratizing the government. Second, they are heavily dependent on foreign donors and this factor has given African repressive governments a pretext to label them as agents of foreign governments. This dependence also has forced them to be disassociated from the local conditions and the local people. In the worst cases, they are found attempting to establish the local CSOs/NGOs as replicas of the CSOs/NGOs of the donor countries (DPMF December 2002: 2).
Moreover, their geographical penetration is heavily tilted to the urban areas. In order to correct these weaknesses, DPMF (December 2002: 22) has proposed the following recommendations: First, CSOs in Africa have to formulate projects relevant to the local conditions and not necessarily to those of donors. Second, they have to mobilize funds from local sources to curtail their dependence on foreign donors. Third, they have to establish or increase their networks with sisterly organizations at the national, sub-regional, and international levels. Fourth, they should genuinely struggle against unjust laws and regulations imposed by governments.

3. Discussion

At the end of the Cold War, many Western democracies vigorously started democracy promotion aid to developing countries. According to Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), the end of the Cold War in Africa was accompanied by mass protests for democratization that became acute from 1988 to 1994. In this period, in various African countries including Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Eritrea, ethnic wars, internal revolts, and guerrilla movements overthrew oppressive governments. The despots of the Cold War period were replaced by young guerrilla fighters who made many promises for democratization. There were also many hopes on the so-called “a new generation” of leaders in Africa in the 1990s (Wachter 14 February 2007), particularly on Paul Kagame of Rwanda; Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and Isaias Afeworki of Eritrea.

These so-called “new generation” of African statesmen were flooded with international economic and political aid. “But to the disappointment of many, this new guard” started “to adopt some of the undemocratic behavior of the dictators it replaced” (Sanders 2006). In the 2005 Ethiopian election, Meles Zenawi brutally suppressed the election-related riots and massacred many people.

Yoweri Museveni of Uganda went even to the extent of re-writing the Constitution so that he could get a chance to run for a third presidential term. In his speech in 2002, Museveni said, “We are people in suits by day but in uniform at night. We fought a liberation war...Don't play around with freedom fighters” (McLaughlin 07 November 2005). As Patric Smith, editor of the African Confidential said, in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda “clearly, all has gone very badly.” According to him, “There were the people that everyone was raving about,” but now “there’s a reversion to the same old instincts” (Sanders 20 February 2006). The recent events in those countries have forced the Africans “to look to yet another generation” (Harman 30 September 2003). The multi-party democracy that started in the first half of 1990s in Africa has clearly gone wrong.
Though Western donors were supposed to apply strong pressure on these African leaders for more democratization, so far, they have failed to do so. Countries like Ethiopia and Uganda receive half of their budgets from Western donors. Due to various reasons, however, the donor countries are not willing to push them too hard. As a certain observer remarked, “After touting these leaders as paragons, and investing billions in them, ‘the West doesn’t want to say, ‘we failed’” (McLaughlin 07 November 2005). Therefore, in contemporary Africa, as Van Hüllen and Stahn (2007) said, “Semi-authoritarian states indeed are the greatest challenge to the planning and implementation of external democracy promotion”.

At present, there is an intense debate on the workability of foreign aid and democracy assistance. Some scholars argue that foreign aid retards democratization by increasing the life span of dictatorial regimes. For instance, Djankov et al (2006), and Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) note that Western aid strengthens non-democratic regimes. Many scholars cite the case of Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda and Eritrea as examples to prove the failure of foreign aid and democracy assistance. For authors like Knack (2004) the effects of Western aid on the democratization process in the recipient countries are insignificant, while Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2008), and Djankov et al (2006) argue that the effects are totally negative. “The general consensus,” says Siegle (2007:6), “is that aid has only a marginal effect on democratic progress”. This is because, in order to make the democratic change effective, there has to be a political will for reform in the receiving countries (Carothers 1999). As Remmer (1995) argues, domestic factors in the receiving countries (e.g. the political leadership) are very crucial for democratic outcomes. Moreover, according to Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), and Goldsmith (2001), the combined effects of democracy assistance and domestic pressure such as popular protests can bring the desired result in Africa. Many scholars also argue that foreign aid (including democracy assistance) is necessary, and to make it effective the donors should follow “aid conditionality.” Diamond (1997: IVXXX) insists for applying international pressure for democracy and “the increasing emphasis on human rights and democracy promotion in the foreign policies of established democracies, especially the United States”.

3.1. Aid Conditionality

Aid conditionality is “the use of pressure, by the donor, in terms of threatening to terminate aid, or actually terminating or reducing it, if conditions are not met by the recipient” (Stokke 1995: 12). According to Clinkenbeard (2002: 12), aid conditionality became the principal policy of the donors since the end of the Cold War. However, due to various reasons this policy is still not properly applied. In Sub-Saharan Africa, this failure was due to the result of two important factors: structural impediments
that limit the effectiveness of the donors, and the lack of donors’ commitment and follow-ups, particularly when foreign policy interests intervene (Brown 2005: 80).

The US has lost the credibility\(^{35}\) of being the principal promoter of democratic values due to President Bush’s policy of creating counter terrorism alliance with brutal dictators like Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan and its attempt to democratize countries such as Iraq by force (Carothers 2009:4-5). According to Carothers (2007: V), democracy promotion of the Unites States under George W. Bush was widely discredited due to its close association with the Iraq war. Under the Bush administration, “The spread of democracy has stagnated in the rest of the world, with democratic reversals or backsliding outweighing gains” (Carothers 2007: V).

Youngs (2008a: 1) argues that the leadership loss of the United States concerning democracy promotion has enhanced the role of the European Union as a global leader in supporting political liberalization in autocratic states. EU’s democracy strategy has been based on three pillars: “the use of positive incentives to stimulate reform”, “the selective use of punitive measure and diplomatic pressure”, “and the funding of democracy programmes” (Youngs 2008a: 1). In general, European countries have been following a policy of incentives for political reform. In Africa, many countries have been rewarded with additional aid and economic cooperation by European countries for their commitment to democratic reform. This measure of the European Union is based on its policy of cooperative rather than a coercive approach to democracy promotion (Youngs 2008a: 2-5). For instance, Sweden, Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands increased aid to Kenya after Daniel Arab Moi lost the election in 2002. Sierra Leone received 200 million Euro aid package from the UK for 2004-2007 following the 2002 elections (Young 2008a: 2-5).

However, as Young (2008a: 2) notes, many European governments do not have consistent strategy for democracy promotion, and they lack effective and clear vision on the relationship between democratization and other political objectives. For instance, European countries supplied Nigeria with a debt relief package worth over 5 billion Euros despite evidence of deterioration in its democratic processes. The UK remains committed to allocating resources principally with the goal of poverty reduction, not in response to political changes (Young 2008a: 4). Spain also increased its aid to Angola despite political repression in the country (Young 2008a: 4). The TPLF-EPRDF government of Ethiopia was also rewarded with aid allocations of over 50 million Euros annually from the EU, Italy, the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany despite the government’s
increased repression against opposition figures (Young 2008a: 5). According to Youngs (2008a 2-5), “The overall correlation between European aid and recipients’ democratic quality remains low in Africa”.

It is true since 2000 European countries have used Article 96 of the Cotonou accord to impose sanctions on some African countries like Ivory Coast, Liberia, Zimbabwe, Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau, Togo, the Republic of Guinea and Mauritania. However, these sanctions were conflict rather than democracy-related (Youngs 2008a: 7). European donors used aid conditionality only in very few cases as temporary measures. For instance, the Dutch and the UK reduced direct budget support to Uganda in 2006 when Museveni hesitated to usher in multiparty politics, and re-channeled assistance to relief efforts in northern Uganda. In Sierra Leone, the UK slightly reduced budget support in 2006 due to governance problem. In Ethiopia, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK suspended or cut back aid in 2005. The European Union Commission resumed full funding as soon as the Ethiopian government agreed to a non-committal dialogue with the Opposition (Youngs 2008a:8). Italy also increased aid to Ethiopia threefold in 2006 and “even much UK aid was in practice soon being spent in much the same way as before the elections” (Youngs 2008a: 8). Moreover, “Many African governments quickly learned how to make the minimum necessary reforms to retain their levels of aid: allowing opposition parties to compete, but not win; permitting an independent press to operate, but not freely; allowing civic groups to function, but not effectively; and consenting that elections be held, but not replace the ruling party” (Brown 2005:184, citing Joseph 1997: 62, and Carothers 1997).

As Brown (2005:186) notes, “Donors, ….. are not monolithic entities; intra-governmental disagreements sometimes result in work at cross-purposes, with one branch of government undermining another one’s efforts.” In the 2005 Ethiopian election, for instance, while the American Congress strongly condemned Ethiopian government officials for human rights abuses, State Department officials followed a business-as-usual approach (see Berhanu 1998EC: 422-423). This was also true with the EU (European Union). As observed in the 2005 election, while the EU parliament strongly and repeatedly denounced the Ethiopian government’s actions against opposition figures and their supporters, the EU Commission on the other hand continued its support to the EPRDF’s government (see Berhanu 1998EC: 422-423).

Some scholars have criticized aid conditionality. For instance, for Lawson (1999: 23), “Democracy promotion, like structural adjustment, will be another experiment on relatively powerless Africans by (perhaps well-intentioned) international ‘mad scientists’”. Lawson (1999: 23) argued that “the creation of democratic institutions cannot be accomplished from outside”. Another scholar, Pinto-Duchhinsky (1997: 307), also
warned that “countries may be justified in mounting efforts to promote democracy abroad, but such projects need to be carried out with care”. Rakner and Menocal (2007: 4) also argue that when the donors offer democracy promotion to African countries they should realize that democratization should be driven from within and should not be imposed from outside. According to Rakner and Menocal (2007: 4), outside help is necessary but the local political, cultural and socio-economic conditions should be properly considered. Moreover, the democracy support should avoid dominance. For obvious reasons, many leaders in developing countries strongly oppose aid conditionality. For instance, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said, “We believe democracy cannot be imposed from outside in any society....To impose it from outside is inherently undemocratic. Each sovereign nation has to make its own decisions and have its own criteria as to how they govern themselves” (AFP 25 January 2008; The Guardian 25 January 2008).

On the other hand, many scholars including African scholars such as Moyo (2009) have strongly criticized Western donors for their failure to properly apply aid conditionality. Dambisa Moyo, in her most controversial book titled, “Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way Africa” (2009), (cited by Frot n.d.) said, “Aid conditionality has not helped to make politicians adopt growth-promoting policies. It relies on a flawed mechanism of non-credible threats. Despite the tough stance towards governments not complying with donor conditions, aid is usually disbursed regardless of broken promises.”

Barratt (2002) argues that in this era of globalization, recipient states’ human rights abuses would be the causes for aid reduction or cessation by donors only when the recipient country is not important economically and when its government is politically weak. To prove this, Barratt (2002) cites two cases where human rights were gravely violated during civil wars: Yugoslavia and Somalia. Relatively speaking, in the Kosovo crisis (Yugoslavia), the response of Western countries and the UN was very swift. On the other hand, in Somalia, more than two years had lapsed before the UN and Western countries decided to intervene. Similarly, in Rwanda, the international response to the genocide and other human rights violations was embarrassing. The fundamental question here is, “Why did the international community, particularly Western donors follow different criteria in the aforesaid countries?” We can say that in dealing with the emerging democracies, Western countries take human rights issues into consideration only occasionally due to various protracted reasons. Moreover, the rise of the neo-liberal approach that gives high importance to global trade for mutual benefit between nations (see Keohane 1993, Lipson 1993, Axelrod and Keohane 1993) compels Western donors to overlook human rights abuses in emerging democracies.41
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a debate whether the major aim of Western donors’ economic aid to developing countries is altruistic or self-interest (Barratt 2002:8). Though, generally, Western donors’ support to emerging democracies is presented as an altruistic measure, it should be noted that they also obtain both material and non-material rewards. According to Owen (2002), powerful states that engage in the promotion of democracy get an opportunity to consolidate their power and influence, and the advancement of democracy is a strategic solution to their security problems. Moreover, as McErvnik (1996) said, the consolidation of democracy in other countries decreases the possibility of conflict.

As I have stated earlier, though Western donors’ policy towards Africa since 1991 has been the promotion of democracy, in practice, there were cases where they themselves became hindrances to the democratization process in the continent. In many instances, Western governments have sided with African electoral autocrats against the pro-democracy movements due to their own political, economic, security and military interests. In the post-1991 Africa, we have observed how Western donors cleverly saved pro-West dictatorial African governments from losing power in the elections. In Kenya, for instance, when the corrupt and pro-West dictator Daniel Arab Moi was at the brink of collapse due to the Opposition’s decision to boycott the election on three occasions between June 1992 and January 1993, the donors “played a role in quickly ending it without the Moi regime making more than minimal concessions” (Brown 2001: 731). According to Brown (2001:731), the donors pressured the Kenyan opposition to end the boycott. In the 1997 election, though the donors’ joint observation team calculated the opposition’s victory (i.e. 106-108 seats to KANU’s 102-104), “At the behest of Canada, France, the USA and especially the UK, donors deliberately suppressed evidence that KANU had not legitimately won a majority in parliament” (Brown 2001: 733-734). Moreover, in the 2008 Kenyan election, as Sisk (2008:18) notes, Kibaki who committed electoral fraud in the presidential poll and who ignited violence was rewarded by the international community (in the mediation effort by the US and Kofi Annan) by brokering power sharing deal to “prevent the further escalation of violence” and to stop the slide of Kenya into the group of the so-called “failed states”.

The most embarrassing interference of Western donors in African elections was the one which was witnessed in the 2005 Ethiopian election. During the post-election crises, Western donors supported Meles Zenawi’s government in spite of the fact that the ruling party had rigged the election (Dadge 19 May 2009). They supported the ruling party: (a) by putting pressure on the opposition parties to withdraw their pre-conditions in the June 10 Pact (Berhanu 1998EC: 401-404; Lidetu 1998EC: 92)44 (b) by forcing the opposition to recognize the authority of the NEBE, which
was pro-EPRDF (c) by compelling the opposition parties to accept the decision of the NEBE regarding the composition and the decision of the CRB (Complaints Review Board) (Berhanu 1998EC: 388-389, 396-398; Lidetu 1998EC: 94-96) (d) by forcing the Opposition to accept the decision of the CIPs (Complaints Investigation Panels) (Berhanu 1998EC: 402-404; Lidetu 1998EC:98-99), and (e) by defusing the three day stay-at-home strike that was declared by the opposition parties (Lidetu 1998EC: 120-122) to kneel down the government.

To sum up, despite “winning” the election, the Ethiopian opposition parties (i.e. CUD and UEDF) were neither allowed to form a government alone nor able to get a power-sharing deal due to their lack of effective and decisive leadership; the NEBE’s biased decision that favored the ruling party; the lack of independent courts; the absence of a neutral army and police; and Western donors’ unwavering support to the ruling party. In the 2005 post-election crises, Western donors brokered not a power-sharing, but a complete capitulation of the opposition parties with the pretext of “stopping the further escalation of the electoral violence and the country’s slide into complete anarchy.”

3.2. Democracy Promotion Assistance to Ethiopia (1991-2012)

Between 1997 and 2003, the leading bilateral donors to Ethiopia (in order of levels of assistance) were the United States, Japan, Italy, Germany, the UK, Canada, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden (USAID 2005). At present, the major multilateral donors that support Ethiopia are the World Bank, the EU, the UN Agencies, and the African Development Bank (USAID 2005). The leading donor in humanitarian assistance for Ethiopia is the US, followed by the EU and World Food Program (USAID 2005). In the Post-Derg Ethiopia, the United States development assistance (particularly in 1999-2001) was around USD 9.6 billion, and 30-50% of this total was relief and humanitarian aid. Democracy and governance assistance held only less than 5-10% of the total (Desalegn and Meheret 2004; de Zeeuv 2004: 6).

The Dutch bilateral support to Ethiopia in 2005 was around 21 million Euros focusing mainly on food security, health care and education. Due to the 2005 election-related violence in Ethiopia, the Netherlands cut the share of its aid going to the federal Ethiopian government from 35% to 15% and increased support for good governance programs (Kausch et al 2006: 150). Disappointed by Meles Zenawi’s handling of the post election crisis, Sweden also froze direct budgetary support to Ethiopia (Kausch et al 2006: 195) and the UK suspended the planned 30 million Euro aid increase to Ethiopia. To be more precise, Britain did not suspend aid but did shift funds towards civil
society organizations and refrained from giving direct support to the government (Kausch et al. 2006: 220). The EU (Commission) also decided to freeze some of its direct aid to the Ethiopian government, and the World Bank showed its displeasure by threatening to cut aid.

As I have already mentioned, Meles Zenawi’s initial pledge for democratization in the first half of 1990s had earned him US support and President Bill Clinton appreciated him as part of a “new generation of leaders.” Addis Ababa-based Western diplomats also admired Meles as a “visionary thinker.” Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was also credited for “bringing a greater sense of democracy and openness” in the country (Pflanz 27 June 2005). However, soon Meles Zenawi reverted to dictatorship and his actions in the 2005 election clearly showed the derailment of the democratization process in the country. The surprising thing is that even after massacring more than 193 demonstrators and detaining more than 40,000 people (Washington Times 18 October 2006) in the 2005 post-election violence many Western leaders still believed that Meles Zenawi was not personally responsible for the election killings.

We can give various reasons for Western donors’ decision to continue their relations with Meles Zenawi’s government after the 2005 election crises. The major reasons are: (a) Ethiopia’s role in the US-led anti-terrorism campaigns (b) Ethiopia’s so-called “economic achievement” (c) The China factor (d) Western donors’ fear that strong pressure on the Ethiopian government would induce instability and the disintegration of the country (e) The absence of strong and reliable Opposition in Ethiopia (f) The donors’ assumption that if they pushed Meles strongly he could end up in attacking Eritrea and would re-ignite the border war (g) The donors’ fear that the poor people of Ethiopia would suffer if economic sanctions were applied (Dadge 19 May 2009; IRIN 30 December 2005), and (h) Western donors’ assumption that pushing Meles Zenawi too far might force him to end up in dictatorship (Berhanu 1998EC: 422). Let me elaborate.

(a) Ethiopia’s Role in Anti-Terrorism Campaigns

The issue of terrorism, particularly Ethiopia’s role in the US-led anti-terrorism campaigns in the Horn of Africa is a key factor that forced Western donors, especially the United States to accommodate the anti-democratic practices of Meles Zenawi (Carothers 2007: 8; Dadge 19 May 2009). Ethiopia is a regional power in the Horn, an area that has become a breeding place for Islamic militant groups, particularly in the state-less Somalia (McLaughlin 07 November 2005; Wondwosen and Jerusalem 2008: 196-214). The United States, according to Richard Cornwell of the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria (South Africa), is not willing to press the Ethiopian
government too hard because, “Ethiopia is a major player in terms of American counter-terror strategy” (McLaughlin 20 October 2005). According to McLaughlin (The Christian Science Monitor 20 October 2005), “Ethiopia’s value to the US stems in part from region’s geography. The nation shares a long stretch of border with Somalia, a lawless country where Al Qaeda and other Islamic militant groups have been known to operate”. As AP (10 June 2005) notes, the United State regards Meles Zenawi “as a progressive African leader and key partner in the war on terror”.57

These days, it has become a fashion for many African leaders including Ethiopia’s leaders to participate (or at least give lip services) in the anti-terror campaigns to tap the economic and political support from the United States and other European countries.58 As a reward, the TPLF-EPRDF government of Ethiopia has been flooded with increasing Western economic and political support. At present, the West is ready to tolerate or accommodate African incumbents’ power abuses and human rights violations as long as they follow pro-Western economic and political policies including anti-terrorism.59 The Ethiopian government joined the US-led anti-terrorism campaigns right after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on New York. Meles Zenawi became very active in the counter-terrorism campaigns, particularly after the 2005 election to appease Western donors’ who were embarrassed and dismayed by his actions against the peaceful demonstrators60. As part of this strategy, Meles Zenawi ordered Ethiopian troops to occupy Somalia61 in 2006 by exaggerating the Islamists’ threats to Ethiopia. It is believed that Meles Zenawi intervened in Somalia, principally to repair his government’s relation with the US, which was severely damaged due to the 2005 post-election violence (Wachter 14 February 2007). It is interesting to note that after the change of administration in the United States and the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia, Meles Zenawi’s intervention in Somalia is getting increasing criticisms from many corners62 (see Newsweek 20 April 2009).

(b) Ethiopia’s “Economic Achievement”

Despite many local criticisms the economic policies of Meles Zenawi’s government (except the land policy and the state monopoly on the telecommunications) have drawn appreciations from the Western donors. One of those who strongly admired the economic policies of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi is Jeffrey Sachs, the Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, and who is the head of the United Nations Millennium Project. Sachs has been constantly recommending Ethiopia for increasing aid under the United Nations Millennium Project (McGill 19 July 2004). Another world class economist, Joseph Stiglitz also appreciates Meles Zenawi’s economic policies (IDPM 4 April 2001; Stiglitz 2007). According to his testimony,63 since Meles Zenawi took power,
“The growth in the economy has been fantastic, growing at 5% a year.” Moreover, Meles Zenawi “had a policy that was directed towards the poor, to the rural sector, which is where 85% of the people lived” (IDPM 4 April 2001). In his article for the Atlantic Monthly, Joseph Stiglitz appreciated Meles Zenawi and admired his integrity. He says, Meles Zenawi was “quick to investigate any accusations of corruptions in his government” (McGill 19 July 2004). Mike Pflanz of the Christian Science Monitor (27 June 2005) also credited Meles for the “economic progress” he has brought to Ethiopia: “Roads which used to be dirt tracks are now paved, cutting transport time from farmer’s fields to markets. More children are in school, with more school books and more teachers teaching them. Mobile phone base stations have sprung up above mud and thatch huts, bringing local businessmen closer” (Pflanz 27 June 2005). As I have attempted to explain, it is true that many Westerners have recognized Meles Zenawi’s efforts for a “rapid economic growth.” It is on this ground the first Yara prize for a green revolution was awarded to him on September 3, 2005 in Oslo, Norway. Moreover, soon he was invited to attend the G20 meeting, which was held in London in April 2009 (Deutsche Welle 2 April 2009). Though he got the privilege to attend and represent Africa in the meeting due to his position as the chairman of the NEPAD, Meles Zenawi attempted to exploit the occasion to repair his tarnished image locally and internationally.

On the other hand, the economic policies of Meles Zenawi have drawn various criticisms. According to Eviator (7 November 2004), “Although Ethiopia’s communists rulers were overthrown more than a decade ago, private land ownership is still forbidden, destroying farmers’ incentives to improve the soil.” At the Council on Foreign Relations, Andrew Natsios, the head of the USAID, had challenged Jeffrey Sachs. In a public debate he argued that Ethiopia has “the worst economic policies next to Zimbabwe in Africa”, and the donors’ economic assistance to Ethiopia was an example of a wasted foreign aid (Eviatar 7 November 2004). Recently, in her sensational book titled “Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How there is a Better way for Africa”, Dambisa Moyo (2009) has used Ethiopia as a case study to criticize the ineffectiveness of the foreign aid in Africa. The other scholar who criticized Meles Zenawi’s economic policy is Franklin Cudjoe. According to Cudjoe (14 December 2005),

“Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi believes that allowing Ethiopians to own their land would make them sell out to multinationals. He seems to have overlooked a basic market practice: It demands a willing seller and a willing buyer at an agreed price. If that price is worth selling for, the farmer might have some money to reinvest elsewhere. If that price is worth buying for, the purchaser must have plans to make the land profitable. If there is no sale, owners might have an incentive to invest in their own land and future, having, at last, the collateral of the land on which to get a loan”. 
Cudjoe (14 December 2005) pointed out that,

"After decades of Socialism, Ethiopia’s agricultural sector, the mainstay of the economy – is less productive per capita than 20 years ago when Band Aid tried to defeat famine. Although 60% of the country is arable, only 10% has been cultivated. Ethiopia is entirely dependent on donations; but instead of grasping reality, Mr. Mr. Zenawi, a member of Tony Blair’s “Commission for Africa,” is forcing resettlement on 2.2 million people”.

According to many local critics, the economic growth of Ethiopia is deliberately exaggerated by the TPLF-EPRDF government. Once, Meles Zenawi claimed that the country’s economic growth in 2009 would be 11.2% (The Reporter 07 March 2009). But IMF’s representative in Ethiopia slashed it to 6.5% (The Reporter 07 March 2009), and the World Bank confirmed IMF’s figure (Daily Monitor 9 April 2009). Furthermore, many local critics do not buy this “economic progress” of Ethiopia under Meles Zenawi. Though it is true that there are many constructions of buildings and industries in the country, they argue that most of these new buildings and industries are owned by top ruling party officials and their business associates68 (Seid 06 September 2008; 5 April 2009; Wachter 14 February 2007) who belong to the ethnic minority Tigreans (see Yeginbot 7 Dimts 4 Sene/June/ 2001EC). Moreover, since the coming to power of Meles Zenawi, the majority of Ethiopian people are not in a position even to get a daily bread. Many local critics have also blamed Meles Zenawi for giving false promises and for releasing fantastic statistics to impress the donors (Seid 16 June 2008). It has to be recalled that in 1991 Meles Zenawi officially declared that every Ethiopian would eat at least two times a day with in few years (The Reporter 22 March 2009b). However, after 19 years of the TPLF rule the majority of the people are still struggling to eat even once in a day.69

C. The China Factor

The third factor is Western donors’ fear that if they pushed the Ethiopian government too hard it would end up in China’s hands. In 2004, China’s export to Ethiopia was over 93% of the two countries’ bilateral trade (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006:220). Moreover, in August 2005, Lieutenant General Zhu Wenquan of China and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi agreed that “Ethiopia and China shall forge mutual cooperation in military training, exchange of military technologies, and peacekeeping missions, among others” (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006:222). Until recently, the influence of China in Africa including Ethiopia was insignificant (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006). In the last few years, however, China’s relations with African countries have dramatically increased. In the 1990s, the Sino-African trade increased by 700%. Between 2000 and 2003 it reached $18.5 billion, and in 2005
it jumped to $32.2 billion (The Guardian 7 October 2006). China has out-gunned the former trade and business partners of Africa (i.e. the US and the UK), and pushed them to third and fourth places. In the last few years, China has become a chief contender against France, Africa’s number one trade partner, and if the situation continues in this way, it is highly likely that China will also overtake France (The Guardian 7 October 2006).

China has become very attractive to African dictators and electoral autocrats because it offers a “rouge aid”, i.e., “development assistance that is non democratic in origin and non transparent in practice; its effect is typically to stifle real progress while hurting average citizens” (Naim 2007). The driving forces for this Chinese “aid” are money, access for raw materials, and international politics. China has a number of objectives in dealing with African countries. In the economic sphere, it wants to consolidate its energy and mineral supplies from Africa. Politically, China’s relation with Africa is directed against Taiwan, former Chinese province. During the Cold War there were many African countries that had recognized Taiwan. One of the aims of China, therefore, is to control and reduce the influence of Taiwan in Africa. Since the end of the Cold War China has been following its “one-China” policy aggressively and many African countries such as Ethiopia have taken measures to satisfy the Chinese political interest. Recently, the parliament of Ethiopia passed a resolution supporting China’s anti-secession law that targeted Taiwan (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006). Many other African countries such as Guinea-Bissau, Uganda, Namibia, Libya, Egypt, Mali, Gabon, Central African Republic, Rwanda, Lesotho, Burundi, Comoros, Zambia, Nigeria, Eritrea, and Mauritania have also supported China’s anti-secession law. Recently, the African Union has passed a resolution to support the one-China policy.

At present, China is being criticized for supporting African authoritarian rulers. According to Eisenman and Kurlantzick (2006), “Chinese support .... has helped African leaders maintain controls on information.” This is conducted by training African regimes on press and internet monitoring (Ibid). Moreover, there is a credible fear that “China’s unwillingness to put any conditions on its assistance to Africa could undermine years of international efforts to link aid to better governance” (The Guardian 7 October 2006). Recently, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister, Zhou Wenzhong, has said “business is business, and China separates business from politics” (The Guardian 7 October 2006). China also offers political assistance even to the worst African dictators in return for economic gains. One clear example is its support to the Sudanese government on the issue of Darfur. China has been blocking the drafted measures against the Sudanese government by using its status as a member of the

United Nation’s Security Council despite the latter’s alleged role in the Darfur genocide (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006:223). 74

To be fair, we have to admit that Africa has also benefited a lot from the Chinese investments in electricity, telecommunications, mining, transportation, and oil production. However, as The Guardian (7 October 2006) rightly puts it, “Africa’s economy may grow, but Africans will continue to suffer.” 75 The other factor that contributed for the rise of China’s influence in Africa is the indifference of the United States towards Africa. Africa had not been a priority for US foreign policy, until al-Qaida attacked New York in September 11, 2001. After this incident the US initiated anti-terrorism or counter terrorism pact with African countries especially with North Africa and East Africa (The Guardian 7 October 2006).

In order to attract African countries, China has forwarded a debt relief programs. For instance, in 2000, China cancelled $1.2 billion of African debt and also wrote off $750 million in 2003. According to Meles Zenawi, one of China’s allies in Africa “China’s exemplary endeavor to ease African countries’ debt problem is indeed a true expression of solidarity and commitment” (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006). Africa has also become a favorite market for China’s arms industry. Between 1996 and 2003 China was the second top supplier of arms to Africa next to Russia. According to Eisenman and Kurlantzick (2006), “In particular, China has developed close military ties with Zimbabwe, Sudan and Ethiopia, three of Africa’s most strategically important States”.

(d) The Western donors’ fear that any instability dismantles Ethiopia

Due to the fragile nature of Ethiopian politics and the ethnic diversity of the country, the Western donors have a nagging fear that strong donor pressure for more democratization could weaken the state authority and disrupt the country’s transition to democracy, and finally might lead the nation and the region to political instability. This fear has made the donors to be reluctant in pressuring Ethiopia's government for more democratic reforms (Berhanu 1998EC: 563). 76 Actually, Western donors have also similar fear for many ethnically divided African countries. According to Brown (2005: 189), “African popular mobilizations ignite a fear of the mob and the sense that anything could happen. Donors and domestic elites are concerned with potential violence, loss of life, populist or socialist policies, property damage, impaired production, interruptions of trade, increased refugee flows or missed debt repayments. The more radical potential of fundamental reform threatens donors’ interests and incites them to seek accommodations that will restore order, at the expense of progressive change.”
The ruling party of Ethiopia has cleverly exploited this fear of the Western donors and has been openly claiming that the country would disintegrate if the TPLF-EPRDF loses political power (Berhanu 1998EC: 340, 580-581). In fact, as early as 1991 the TPLF-EPRDF has been following a well-executed plan of “scare tactic” to convince the Western donors that ethnic federalism was the only way out for Ethiopia’s political problems and the TPLF-EPRDF is the only savior of the country from a total collapse. Moreover, the ruling party has been stifling and persecuting the non-ethnic and pan-Ethiopian parties that opposed the ruling party’s ethnic politics. The TPLF-EPRDF government has been accusing the pan-Ethiopian parties as “chauvinist parties” that would not hesitate “to take away the rights and the privileges of the ethnic minorities” and “create instability and chaos in the country.”

(e) The absence of strong opposition in Ethiopia

The fifth factor is the absence of strong opposition that could replace to the TPLF-EPRDF government and maintain stability in the country. The Western donors consider Ethiopian opposition parties as fragmented, fragile, weak, irresponsible and undemocratic. Moreover, they have suspicions that the Ethiopian opposition groups are “very hawkish about Eritrea”, and would rekindle the war with a neighboring Eritrea if they got political power (see Berhanu 1998EC: 423; McLaughlin 07 November 2005). This exaggerated fear of the Western donors has helped the TPLF-EPRDF’s government tremendously.

It is true, after 1991 many opposition parties, particularly ethnic-based political parties have emerged in the country, and the TPLF-EPRDF, as an ethnic-based party coalition, has been encouraging the formation of political parties along ethnic lines and tacitly discouraged the non-ethnic or pan-Ethiopian parties. Moreover, though the TPLF-EPRDF government has also allowed non-ethnic parties to be formed still the government is busy in creating obstacles to them. Therefore, at present, there are only very few non-ethnic parties in the country that aim to unite all Ethiopians under a pan-Ethiopia umbrella. Furthermore, the TPLF-EPRDF-dominated government harasses and persecutes those non-ethnic parties, particularly the ones that have the potential to unite the people. As Harbeson (1996) said, in the first half of the 1990s, individuals and groups who were identified with the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) were not legally allowed to participate in the country’s politics. Moreover, those political organizations that refused to renounce armed struggle are still banned. Therefore, The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), the “All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement” (i.e., MEISON), OLF (Oromo Liberation Front), ONLF
(Ogaden National Liberation Front) and other similar political groups are not allowed to participate in the Ethiopian politics (Wondwosen 2008a: 780-809).

As Chege et al (2007) noted, from 1995 to 2004, despite the mushrooming of political parties in the country, the freedom of opposition parties to freely operate was so circumscribed that none of them even had the slightest chance of competing against the TPLF-EPRDF. In the 2005 parliamentary election, however, for the first time the ruling party allowed opposition parties to freely campaign and compete for political power. In this election, the opposition parties, particularly the CUD (Coalition for Unity and Democracy) and the UEDF (United Ethiopia Democratic Front) openly challenged the incumbent party and scored high electoral results. Alarmed by the election results and the success of the opposition parties, the incumbent party flexed its military muscle and smashed the Opposition’s electoral victories. In the post-election period in 2005, the CUD (Coalition for Unity and Democracy), the most influential and successful non-ethnic opposition party, was severely persecuted by the government. The cadres of the TPLF-dominated government branded the CUD as a party supported only by the “chauvinist” Amhara people (BBC 23 July 2007; Berhanu 1998EC: 423) that fights for the “Amhara supremacy” (Abbink 2006: 173-179) though the leadership and the membership of the CUD party showed heavy ethnic diversity.

When the propaganda campaign that was designed to mobilize other ethnic groups against the CUD failed, the government brought the CUD leaders to court and they were sentenced to life imprisonment on fabricated charges of “genocide”, “treason” and “attempt to topple the constitutional order by force.” Finally, due to the international outcry and domestic pressure, they were given “clemency.” After crushing the pro-democracy movement that engulfed the country by killing, arresting and intimidating many Opposition leaders and their supporters, the government deliberately shrank the political space. At present, almost all the legally-registered opposition parties (except the fake opposition groups) are unable to conduct their activities freely. For all practical purposes, as Chege et al (2007: 35-36) noted, contemporary Ethiopia can be accurately described as a one party-dominated state.

4. Conclusions

During the Cold War, the Western donors were giving foreign aid even to dictatorial regimes, sometimes, preventing transitions to democratic rule (Brown 2005:179-180). Since the end of the Cold War, with the hope of improving the accuracy, efficiency and the legitimacy of elections in transitional democracies, the Western donors have been giving democracy promotion assistance in a broad range of activities. The assistance includes financial and technical supports for
constitutional and legal reforms, for the creation and functioning of electoral management bodies, for voter registration and education initiatives (Reilly 2003: 13). In this period, though the Western donors attached foreign aid to political and economic reforms, the result was not satisfactory. As observed in the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, strings-attached aid perhaps was successful in facilitating a transition from one party state to a multi-party system. But for sure as I have tried to explain in this paper, it has failed in helping countries to successfully complete their transition to a consolidated democracy largely due to the Western donors’ lack of commitment and follow-ups (caused by their competing economic, commercial and strategic interests) (Brown 2005: 179), and the domestic conditions in the recipient countries (e.g. the refusal or the reluctance of electoral autocrats for further democratization and their alliance with non-democratic countries such as China).

Though donors threaten to terminate or reduce aid unless the recipient country respects human rights, usually the rhetoric is not followed by actions. As Lawson (1999: 23) argues, the international pressure on African electoral autocrats lacks sufficient commitment. In Ethiopia, for instance, the British threatened to cut aid because of the Ethiopian government’s human rights violations in the 2005 post-election crises. However, due to various reasons which are explained in this paper the British government decided not to implement it. According to Carey (2006: 22), despite the rhetoric of the British government, “The Ethiopian Finance Minister Sufyan Ahmad was confident aid would not be reduced”. European donors such as Germany, France, Britain and even the European Commission still do not show commitment and their aid policies do not give sufficient emphasis to human rights records of the recipient countries (Carey 2006). As the World Bank (1998) noted, cited by Carey (2006: 3), in low-income countries, a foreign aid is the major source of external finance. Therefore, had donors showed a genuine commitment to democratization and human rights issues in transitional democracies, political situations would have got a better chance for improvement. According to Carey (2006: 2), despite paying a lip service to democratization in Africa, still “bureaucratic inertia and colonial ties are the main determinants of who receives aid and how much aid is given to a particular country”.

The democratic transition in Ethiopia that started in 1991 with the coming to power of the TPLF-EPRDF is in a very dangerous situation. At present, the country is not moving to a consolidated democracy, but to a hybrid system, and there is a concrete evidence that soon it will end up in absolute form of authoritarian rule. The massacre of many peaceful protestors in the 2005 Ethiopian election, according to Rakner and Menocal (2007:19), showed the government’s shifts
toward authoritarianism, and “when faced with the real threat of being ousted from power, the incumbent EPRDF was determined to stay in power by all means”.

According to McLaughlin (07 November 2005), in the post Cold War period, a rapid economic growth was seen in some African countries such as Ethiopia and Uganda. For instance, Ethiopia’s economy showed 12% growth in 2004. The economic growth has helped the government of Meles Zenawi to get a strong support from the Western donors (McLaughlin 07 November 2005). However, as Chris Tomlinson (13 May 2005) said, the 2005 election violence and the way it was handled has put a question mark on the reliability of the Ethiopian and the other African leaders who have been giving promises to democratize their countries and adhere to good governance in return for greater aid and debt relief. A week after the outbreak of the first electoral violence in 2005 Chris Tomlinson confessed, “The type of backsliding into old authoritarian ways seen last week in Ethiopia’s Capital could be an excuse for the world to turn its back on the continent once again, fearing any aid given now could be wasted like the money given to African dictators during the cold war” (The Bakersfield Californian 14 June 2005). According to Tomlinson, “For the Ethiopian government, the trick is to walk a fine line between reforming as much as necessary to keep foreign aid coming, while still ensuring the ruling party’s hold on power (The Bakersfield Californian 14 June 2005). The Herald (04 November 2005) also said, “Meles has been lauded in the West as a new kind of African leader, appointed by Tony Blair to his Commission for Africa to help draft a blue print for ending poverty and building democracy. However, his government has little tolerance for dissent and has been accused of severe human rights abuses”.

In conclusion, we can say that the Western donors’ democracy promotion assistance that has been provided to Ethiopia since 1991 has given little attention to the independence, accountability, transparency and the sustainability of the recipient state and the non-state actors such as the electoral management body (NEBE), civil society, political parties, courts, parliament, the media etc. Therefore, Western donors’ assistance has failed to bring a long term impact on the process of democratization in the country. Though it is usually said that Western donors’ assistance has been instrumental in fostering democratic initiatives in Ethiopia, this paper concludes that the donors’ democracy assistance is not as effective as it should have been due to the various reasons explained in this paper. The pro-democracy movement that engulfed the country in the 2005 parliamentary election which saw the involvement of civil society and the independent media, and the stunning electoral gains of the pro-democracy opposition parties were brutally crushed by the TPLF-EPRDF government. Western donors did not take any tangible measure against the Ethiopian government mainly due to the latter’s role in the US-led anti-terrorism campaigns in the Horn of Africa and
Meles Zenawi’s membership in Tony Blair’s Commission for Africa (Dadge 19 May 2009). According to Herman Cohen (VOA 16 May 2006), the former US Assistant Secretary of the State for Africa, conflicting interests prevented Westerner donors from applying more pressure on the Ethiopian government in the areas of governance and human rights. “The western countries have to balance interests. They are interested in better human rights and more democracy in Ethiopia. At the same time, they are interested in maintaining stability and security. So it’s very difficult for the West to be harsh with the Ethiopian government while at the same time ask for their cooperation,” he said.

The Western donors once again demonstrated that even after the end of the Cold War, they are still following the policy of rewarding or tolerating dictatorships in developing countries as long as the autocratic leaders show solidarity with the West’s security interests. Moreover, the Ethiopian experience revealed that the strong desire which Western donors showed for African democratization in the 1990s is gradually fading away in the last few years. What exists today, according to Joseph (1999: 70), is the “convergence and compromise between the interests of Western powers and African states…. …in the tacit acceptance of virtual democracies as an acceptable form of governance”.

Today, in many African transitional democracies the process of democratization appears to be backsliding, and authoritarian governments such as China have started to replace the Western donors as a source of economic support and hence good alternatives for electoral to achieve development without having engaging in risky democratic and social reforms. Therefore, the United States and the European Union should have a responsibility in recovering the status of democracy promotion, which was battered during George Bush’s administration. The election of Barak Obama as the US president should be used as the right opportunity to save the African transitional democracies from their manipulative electoral autocrats such as the TPLF leaders, and to return them to the right track of the democratization process. As Michalski (2009: 3) notes, “There is clearly a window of opportunity” for both the US and the EU, “To advance shared principles and values”. “Of course” it should be noted, as Leicht (2009) argued, “donors cannot and should not dictate policy to Ethiopia’s government and there is no question that Ethiopia, one of the world’s poorest countries, needs support. But this does not mean that donors should ignore the reality that their important material support to that government carries with it a responsibility to insist on respect for Ethiopians’ basic human rights.”
End Notes

1 There are three types of foreign aid: (1) Humanitarian relief aid- This is given to victims of natural disasters such as famine, earthquake, flood etc. (2) Military aid (3) Economic development aid (i.e. official development assistance (ODA)). The sources of ODA are bilateral donors (government to government), and multilateral donors such as The World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank, the Commonwealth Development Corporation, the European Development Bank, the OPEC Special Fund, etc. For Berhanu (2001:169), development aid “involves the transfer of resources from official or private institutions to low-income economies in the form of loans on concessional terms, technical assistance, and outright grants”.

2 For Van Hüllen and Stahn (2007), international democracy promotion is “an external actor’s explicit attempt to directly establish or advance democracy as a regime type in a target country”.

3 Despite its growth, democracy aid still comprises less than 10% of the overall aid funding (Siegle 2007: 4).

4 According to Youngs (2008b: 160-161), recently the United Kingdom has surpassed Germany in political foreign aid spending.

5 According to Karume (2003: 3), “While donors in general do not fund political parties, as it is prohibited by electoral acts of most recipient countries, they do offer assistance in terms of training, seminars and conferences.” As Deegan (2003: 2) notes, “The international donor community was fearful of directly involving itself in party development, preferring instead to fund NGOs which did not arouse accusations of political interference.” However, at present, even Western democracy aid to NGOs/CSOs in Africa has met serious opposition from electoral autocrats as the case of Ethiopia clearly demonstrates. Recently, the Ethiopian government has introduced a repressive proclamation criminalizing the involvement of foreign NGOs/CSOs in human rights activities (see Wondwosen 2009a: 80-95).

6 Carlson and Walecki (2006: 7) argue that in post-conflict elections funding from illegal sources, Diaspora groups and foreign nationals “can hinder reconciliation between formerly warring factions and efforts to replace the bullets with ballots.”

7 For details on authoritarian practices of party leaders in Africa, see Wondwosen (2009c: 1-15).

8 The foundations are associated with various German parties: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) with the Social Democrats (SPD), Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) with the Christian Democrats (CDU); Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FNS) with the Liberal Party; Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (HSS) with the Bavarian Christian Social Union; Heinrich-Boll-Stiftung (HBS) with the Green party (Wondwosen 2009e: 119-132).

9 International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) (formerly, the “International Foundation for Election Systems”).

10 According to Solomon Abebe, spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, the representatives of the three American organizations entered Ethiopia with a tourist visa “without getting any authority or without making any agreement with the concerned bodies” (AP 31 March 2005) (For details, see Wondwosen 2008b: 119-137).

11 The donors supported the contending political parties and the independent candidates through ERIS in close cooperation with the NEBE (National Electoral Board of Ethiopia). According to NEBE, in line with the agreement between the NEBE and ERIS, the donors (through ERIS) handed over the cash to the NEBE, and the NEBE purchased election-related goods and distributed them to the participant parties and the independent candidates (The Ethiopian Herald 18 August 2005; 26 July 2005).

12 In this case, the amount of money offered by the ERIS was for 75 candidates in each political party.

13 According to the former CUD official, Berhanu Nega (1998 BC: 279-283), the European Union (through the UNDP) gave the CUD around 43, 000 USD (in kind) during the 2005 parliamentary election.

ERIS gave financial/material assistance not only to the political parties, but also to various CSOs/NGOs that facilitated the 2005 Ethiopian election. For instance, Fafen Development, a local NGO, received financial/material support from ERIS to its project that involved giving training on election-related issues in the Somali regional election (The Ethiopian Herald 26 July 2005).

Donno (2006: 4) argues that for any opposition party “an international verdict that elections were manipulated can be a tremendous boon, boosting its popular support, discrediting the incumbent and increasing its chances for victory via clean elections in the future.”

For instance, according to Brown (2001), in Kenya (in the 1990s) donors showed lack of commitment for a genuine poll and attempted to derail the peoples’ attempt for more democratic political system. In the 2005 parliamentary election in Ethiopia, the African Union election observers and the Carter Center approved the election in spite of the fact that the ruling EPRDF party rigged the election (Wondwosen 2008b: pp. 119-137).

Various international election observers signed a memorandum of understanding with the NEBE. For instance, a memorandum of understanding between the NEBE and the European Union concerning election observation was signed by the then NEBE Chairman, Kemal Bedri Kelo, and Timothy Clarke, the EU representative in Ethiopia, on March 12, 2005 in Addis Ababa.

The best example here is the recent proclamation in Ethiopia on NGOs/CSOs (For details, see Wondwosen 2009a: 80-95).

For instance, Belarus president, Alexandr Lukashenka, said “all colored revolutions are pure and simple banditry”……….. “In our country, there will be no pink or orange, or even banana revolution” (NED 2006: 6).

It is reported that Alexandr Lukashenka of Belarus acquired China’s latest internet monitoring technology while in Beijing in December 2005 (NED 2006: 7).

The major donor countries to African civil society organizations are the United States, Germany, the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and Canada (Robinson 1996: 209).

For instance, as narrated by Eizenstat (2004: 20), the US government decided to provide financial support to Palestine through NGOs rather than funneling funds through the official government channels due to the corruption and poor management style of the Palestinian government. Similar situation occurred in Ethiopia in the post-2005 election, where Western donors such as Britain decided to channel aid through NGOs rather than through the EPRDF government due to its human rights violations and the violent crackdown of election protestors (ODI 20 January 2006).

As Ottaway (2005: 131) argues, though governments in developing countries welcome foreign funding to charitable organizations, for sure, they are uncomfortable with foreign funding of advocacy organizations.

In Ethiopia, after 2001 SIDA supported those NGOs/CSOs involved in human rights issues and democracy awareness such as the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, the Ethiopian Women Lawyers’ Association and the Ethiopian Economic Association (Kausch et al 2006: 195). In 2004, SIDA allocated 2.6 million euros for democratic governance projects, 7% of its total aid to Ethiopia (Kausch et al 2006: 195).

A large number of civil society organizations in Africa are heavily dependent on Western donors. This is true even in the former socialist countries of East Europe. For instance, for Lane (2006: 16) the major obstacle for civil society’s structural improvements in Poland is their dependency on sponsors, most of which are foreign donors.

Appiagyei-Atua (n.d) argues that in Africa the suppression of the traditional notion of civil society has paved a way for the “importation of the Western European Colonialists’ own version of civil society”.

In the current economic situations in Africa this proposal is highly unlikely to be implemented.

In Ethiopia, it has become increasingly difficult to give democracy aid to non-state actors due the government’s obstructionist policy. The recently-declared civil society and media laws are parts of the government’s policy of obstructing the democracy assistance (see Wondwosen 2009a: 80-95; 2009b:84-112).
Many Ethiopian scholars, particularly in the Diaspora, believe that Western aid has enabled Meles Zenawi’s government to stay in power despite his defeat in the 2005 election. In many cities of Europe and the Unites States, Diaspora Ethiopians have held demonstrations asking Western donors to stop supporting Meles Zenawi’s government, particularly after the 2005 election (See Angola Press 08 July 2005; EMF 2 April 2009; Sudan Tribune 9 November 2005; The Washington Times 9 July 2005).

This is particularly true during the Cold War. For instance, Chomsky and Herman (1979) argued that foreign aid strengthened military dictators during the Cold War. For Danaher, Berryman, and Benjamin (1987), aid simply extends the tenure in office of the elites (ruling class) in developing countries and give them a chance to continuously suppress their people.

The young leaders of those countries were acclaimed by Western governments and media as “the next generation of great leaders.” The leaders of these countries fought their way to political power through bloody guerrilla wars. As soon as they got political power, they allowed opposition parties to function in their respective countries, giving a green signal for a democratization process. “But they’re balking at the final step in democracy’s process: giving power” (Mc Laughlin 07 November 2005).

According to Knack (2004) and Goldsmith (2001), international aid to developing countries can increase democracy level by increasing literacy, health and wealth factors. As Lipset (1959) and Barro (1997) note, these factors may lead to democratization. For Goldsmith (2001: 137) “better educated and healthier people, ....may make better informed and more active citizens, who are the lifeblood for democratic institutions”.

Cinkenbeard (2002: 12-14) calls it “negative conditionality” to differentiate it from the “positive conditionality”, that is, non confrontational democracy promotion strategy that focuses on positive inducement. The EU’s democracy assistance program emphasizes a cooperative approach (i.e. positive conditionality), while the US employs both confrontational (negative conditionality) and cooperative approaches (Cinkenbeard 2002: 12-14). Clinkenbeard (2002: 12) divides aid conditionality in to “proactive” conditionality and “reactive” conditionality depending upon the phase of the democratization process of the recipient country. When the donor threatens to freeze aid to compel an authoritarian regime to liberalize or to democratize and hold elections is called “proactive” aid conditionality. On the other hand, “reactive” aid conditionality is the situation where the donor threatens to stop or reduce aid to a democratizing state to deter it from “backsliding” or to prevent it from anti-democratic reversion toward authoritarianism.

Carey (2006: 5) argues that the asymmetric power relationship between the donor and the recipient is instrumental in the workability of aid conditionality.

As Price (2009: 162) notes, “When the United States....is seen as intervening against democracy, it not only undermine the democracy agenda but also the credibility of US global leadership”.

According to Carothers (2009:4-5), “Toward America’s two principal challengers, China and Russia, as well as in the many other areas of U.S. strategic or economic engagement with non democratic states, such as with Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, the Gulf states, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan, the Bush administration downplayed democracy for the sake of other interests.”

According to Salih and Nordlund (2007: 22), the insistence for good governance as a precondition for supplying aid by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, Western donors, and lobby groups of the Western democracies has created an opportunity for opposition political parties “to seek more favors from the governing political parties in return for silence”.

One of the top Ethiopian opposition leaders, Berhanu Nega, has claimed that in the 2005 post-election crisis, while the ruling party was facing a strong popular protest, the EU Security Commissioner, Louis Mitchell, confirmed the EU’s decision to work with the Ethiopian government and advised Meles Zenawi to solve the crisis wisely as early as possible so that the EU maintains its assistance (1998EC: 422-423). It is interesting to note that disappointed by the measures of the European countries, particularly when Germany extended an invitation to Meles Zenawi to attend the German African Forum hosted by the German President, and due to Tony
Blair’s letter of congratulations to Meles Zenawi on his election for a third five-year term (after massacring many people in June and November electoral conflicts) Prof. Mesfin Wolde Mariam, the noted Ethiopian scholar and human rights activist-turned politician, condemned Western democracies for their failure to genuinely supporting the democratic process in Ethiopia. According to him, “It is a mockery of human rights when such leading democratic countries as Germany and Britain greet the leader of a country only a few days after his government was involved in mass murder of demonstrators” (Monsters and Critics 27 November 2005).

Moreover, disgusted by Western donors’ duplicity a veteran Ethiopian diplomat, Imru Zeleke, sent back the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit Medal, which was awarded to him by the German government decades ago when he was Ethiopia’s ambassador to Germany (See: Imiru Zeleke 21 November 2005), <http://www.andenetdemocracy.org/archive-nov.html> (Accessed 10 December 2005).

Furthermore, annoyed by the EU Commission’s actions, Ana Gomes, who was the head of the EU-EOM in the 2005 Ethiopian election, repeatedly urged the Commission to change its stance regarding the government of Meles Zenawi (see The Guardian 19 October 2006; The New York Times 14 November 2005, 19 October 2006; Yeroo Jimma Times 11-11-2008).

Aid conditionality has two sub-sections: “political conditionality” and “economic conditionality”. Political conditionality is, “Cutting, or cutting off aid when democracy, human rights or corruption worsens” (Lekvall 2009-05-13). On the other hand, economic conditionality targets the economic policies of the recipient country.

The influential Indian liberation fighter, Mohandas K. Gandhi, was also the earliest proponent of this idea. He said, “The spirit of democracy can not be imposed from without. It has to come from within” (Tendulkar 1961:301).

For many centuries in the past political realism, which is the brain child of Machiavelli (Whelan 2004) was dominant. In the contemporary world, as cited by Hoffmann (1999), realists like Kennan and Carr and Oppenheim, argue for less ethical considerations in the international politics.

After studying the US’ foreign aid policy in the past, Peceny (1999) (cited in Brown 2005: 188) concluded that “the US has historically subordinated democracy promotion to its security interests.”

In the 2005 election, Ethiopia was expected to demonstrate its path to democracy because the US administration had openly declared that the US would no longer need authoritarian allies, and rather would give priority for democracy and freedom. According to Jimmy Carter, the former president of the United States, “A democratically elected government would be an ideal partner of the United States in the war against international terrorism” (Wondwosen 2008b: 129). Just few days before the May 2005 election, Chris Tomlinson (13 May 2005) wrote that “legitimacy is important to Meles, who has a reputation for being one of the more progressive leaders in Africa. Ethiopia has also become one of the US’s closest allies and a key player in the war on terrorism. With the US administration placing a high value on freedom and democracy and saying the US will no longer put up with authoritarian allies, Ethiopia must demonstrate at least some progress in this election”. Roughly, the donor countries offered $1.9 billion assistance to Ethiopia annually and they were pressuring the government to conduct free and fair election. The donor countries considered election in Ethiopia as a litmus test for the ruling party’s commitment to democratic reform. That is why, a year before the 2005 election, Louis Michel, EU’s Development and Humanitarian Aid Commissioner, said “we are in a much stronger position to make progress on human rights issues with direct budget support because the stakes are so much higher” (Mail & Guardian 19 December 2004). The EU alone, for instance, pledged to give Ethiopia $466million in budgetary support from 2005 to 2008, and Louis Michel hoped this financial support would be used as “leverage” over the Ethiopian government authorities (Mail & Guardian 19 December 2004). According to Helga Graefin Strachwit, Germany’s ambassador to Ethiopia, “The question of good governance, including democratization, is definitely one of the criteria for direct budget support…….you wouldn’t give budget support to a country where you were not convinced that good governance would at least be a high topic if it were not already in place……to give budget aid you must be convinced that the right direction at least is being taken” (Mail & Guardian 19 December 2004). The aid flow from the donor countries to Ethiopia had been increasing every
year except in 1998-2000 bloody border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The war had caused the reduction of the donors’ aid to Ethiopia by about $600-million. Therefore, it was beyond doubt that in order to be sure of the continuity of the Western aid Ethiopia needed a clean election in May 2005.

Many critics held the opinion that the June 10 Pact was the first major capitulation of the opposition parties to the intimidation tactics of the ruling party, and the one-sided pressure of the donor countries. Though, in principle, the agreement to settle the violence peacefully and to be abided by the decisions of the NEBE and the courts was expected from every legal political party, the absence of an independent electoral management body, independent courts, neutral army and the Police made the non-violence pact meaningless. In democratic countries, where such institutions are neutral and independent, legally-registered political parties are expected to be abided by the Constitution and the laws. However, in Ethiopia, the above-mentioned institutions are controlled by the incumbent party and the participation of opposition parties in the elections has no significance. The incumbent’s sole aim in allowing opposition parties to participate in the elections is for international consumption and to get legitimacy.

When the opposition parties declared a three day stay-at-home strike, tension highly increased in the country and Western donors led by the US Embassy intervened and neutralized the Opposition’s plan of paralyzing the government. First, the donors defused the political tension by initiating a useless dialogue between Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and the opposition (CUD-UEDF) representatives, Dr. Berhanu Nega and Dr. Beyene Petros. In order to start the dialogue, Prime Minister Meles offered a pre-condition that the opposition parties (CUD and UEDF) cancel the stay-at-home strike. According to Lidetu (1998EC:120-122), the Opposition agreed to cancel the strike due to the donors’ pressure, while Berhanu (1998EC 488-492) insisted that it was to avoid unnecessary confrontation with the government. The Opposition statement, released on October 1, 2005 confirmed the donors’ intervention: “We have been in continual contact with several ambassadors and they have also been in contact with the Prime Minister. As a result of these discussions we have cancelled our stay-at-home strike announced earlier today. We are committing ourselves to press for our objectives through a democratic and parliamentary process. We understand that based on the talks of the International Community with Prime Minister Meles and our declaration the talks will begin as early as tomorrow. We believe this advance the democratic process in a peaceful and constructive manner.” (See: US Embassy in Ethiopia. “Statement by Ambassador Vicki Huddleston, Charge D’Affaires of the U.S. Embassy, and Ambassador Bob Dewar, Ambassador of the United Kingdom. “<http://addisababa.usembassy.org/>).

Following the Opposition’s statement, Prime Minister Meles agreed to talk with the Opposition. However, after conducting the negotiations half-heartedly for few days, the government abruptly terminated the dialogue (Sudan Tribune 5 October 2005). The negotiators failed even to agree on setting the agenda. Then, the Opposition announced the failure of the negotiation to the public on Friday, October 7, 2005: “We respectfully inform the Ethiopian people and the International community that the negotiations have been discontinued due to the intransigent position taken by EPRDF” (Reuters 8 October 2005). According to their statement, though the opposition agreed to negotiate with the EPRDF without any pre-conditions, still the negotiation failed. The statement said, “However EPRDF reversed its agreement to go into negotiation without limiting the agenda items and rejected a number of items that we wished to present for discussion” (Reuters 8 October 2005). According to Beyene Petros of the UEDF, the ruling party rejected an agenda that called for the creation of an independent body to probe into the June killings (Reuters 8 October 2005). Prime Minister Meles Zenawi accepted the donors’ call for a dialog just to buy time and to ensure the continuity of the foreign aid, which was stalled due to the insistence of Western donors for a dialogue (see Youngs 2008a:8).

In a sample study conducted by the EU-EOM, and the opposition parties’ calculations (see Berhanu 1998EC: 385-386), it was revealed that the ruling party was defeated. However, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s party was declared “winner” after rigging the election, as The Newsweek (20 April 2009) belatedly admitted. Gebru Asrat (20 September 2008) and Dadge (19 May 2009)
have also confirmed the stunning electoral defeat of the ruling EPRDF party in the 2005 election. According to the German-Foreign-Policy.com (2008-06-26), the Ethiopian government “was only able to survive parliamentary elections by committing massive electoral fraud.”

In the various negotiations between the ruling party and the opposition parties, the Western donors (US and EU) were not neutral mediators. They favored the ruling party due various reasons as explained elsewhere in this paper. PINR (25 October 2005) described the dilemma of Western donors in the tense confrontation between the ruling party and the Opposition in the 2005 election as follows: “The strategic interests of Ethiopia’s donor powers would have been served best had the opposition acquiesced in the electoral results and had Zenawi shown signs that he would move democratization forward. Since neither requisite for stability has been met, Washington and Brussels are left with a dilemma. If they back either side, they drive the other into opposition to them. Yet if they do not enter the fray, they risk chronic instability in a country that is essential to their strategic purposes in the region. For the moment, the Washington-Brussels partnership is reduced to calling for dialogue between the adversaries. Since the May elections, the donor powers have continued to provide and expand aid to the Zenawi government and to criticize it for election irregularities and suppression of dissent. At the same time, they have attempted to pressure the opposition to limit the scope and intensity of its resistance to the regime. Both adversaries have expressed their dissatisfaction with that response. Look for the donor powers to keep playing their waiting game, which favors Zenawi, until one of the adversaries achieves a clear advantage.”

US’s national interests in Ethiopia include counterterrorism, economic prosperity and security, democracy and human rights, and regional stability (USAID 2005).

In 2004, the largest three Swedish aid recipient African countries were Mozambique, Ethiopia and Uganda (Kausch et al 2006: 196).

The repressive actions of the Ethiopian government were embarrassing to Tony Blair because he used to admire Meles Zenawi as part of a “new breed” of reformist African leaders. Moreover, it was Tony Blair who single-handedly selected Meles to be a member of his highly publicized 17-member commission for Africa whose aim was campaigning debt relief, greater aid “and more trade opportunities for African countries in return for economic and democratic reforms” (Times on Line 03 November 2005). The strong support of the British government to Meles Zenawi enraged anti-TPLF-EPRDF Ethiopian demonstrators in the 2005 post-election crises. According to the report of Times on Line (03 November 2005), some demonstrators in Addis Ababa shouted at a certain British journalist, ‘Tell Blair to open his eyes’, ‘Tell your Government what is happening here,’” and “when the West going to realize this government is a bunch of morons?” The displeasure of Britain was very clear when it suspended £ 70 of direct budget support to Ethiopia (Times on Line 13 February 2006). CNN (18 January 2006) also reported that Britain cut off all its aid to Ethiopia’s government and redirected the 70 million euro to humanitarian agencies functioning in Ethiopia. In fact, before announcing this decision, Hillary Benn, Britain’s International Development Secretary, had met Meles Zenawi and voiced Britain’s concern. Benn said, “Because of our concerns over the political situation I have told the (Ethiopian prime minister) that we can not provide direct budget support under the current circumstances” (CNN 18 January 2006).

As I have stated above, the way Meles Zenawi handled the election conflicts had deeply shocked Tony Blair. This deep anger of Tony Blair was visible when he met Meles Zenawi in the summit of “progressive” world leaders held in South Africa in February 2006. In his press briefing in the conference, Tony Blair told reporters that the Ethiopian government had overreacted: “This is not a question of a government stealing an election to try to hang on to power, it is the government reaction to the reaction to the result that we consider if may be undiplomatic – to be an overreaction” (Times on Line 13 February 2006). Describing the icy diplomatic atmosphere between Tony Blair and Meles Zenawi, Times on Line (13 February 2006) notes, “Whereas the other leaders’ chairs were placed in such a way that they almost rubbed shoulders, a large gap opened up behind the place names of the UK and Ethiopia.” Narrating exactly what happened between Tony Blair and Meles Zenawi at the end of the conference, Times on Line (13 February 2006) reported, “Afterwards, Mr. Blair warmly shook the hands of Thabo Mbeki of South Africa
and Göran Persson from Sweden, hugged Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil and kissed Helen Clark from New Zealand. All contact with Mr. Meles, though, was avoided.”

Many British newspapers had also criticized Meles Zenawi. For instance, The Telegraph (16 December 2005) notes, “A leader handpicked by Tony Blair to champion Africa has smashed his opponents with the biggest crackdown in the continent’s recent history, jailing 40,000 people including boys of 15....A crackdown on this scale has not been seen in Africa for 20 years and the repression exceeds anything by President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe for the past decade at least. Apartheid-era South Africa’s onslaught against the black townships in the 1980s provides the only recent comparison.” On the other hand, Meles Zenawi protested Britain’s decision to withdraw the budgetary support to Ethiopia. Sarcastically he remarked that the British government was “entitled to do what it wanted with its ‘own and British tax payers’ money” (Times on Line 13 February 2006). In one of his briefings to the local media, Meles Zenawi also announced that his government had the “capacity to run regular activities and main development programmers of the country through its own expenditure, should any serious measures be taken by development partners” (Reuters 28 January 2006).

51 However, from the start the EU was reluctant to take actions. For instance, the spokesman of the Commission, Amadeu Altafaj Tardio said, “The European Commission and other donors have doubts that the necessary conditions are in place to go ahead with budget support...What we’ve done is not suspend (making funds available), but delay taking a decision to go ahead with this budget support....Given the current instability....it doesn’t seem possible to go ahead” (Sudan Tribune 30 December 2005).

52 Out of $1.2 billion development assistance Ethiopia received from donors in that year, the World Bank provided $450 million. In addition to the aforesaid development aid, the country received $700 million in emergency aid to fight against frequent droughts and food shortages (IOL 2005-11-16). During the 2005 election crisis, the World Bank country director, Isaac Diwan, said “aid will be cut. The question is by how much? We have sent very clear signals that international and World Bank assistance will be cut over time if the governance situation does not improve.” However, the country Director expressed his worry that the aid cut might seriously affect the poor people in the country. Moreover, he noted that economic problems in the country would aggravate political crisis and this had worried the donor countries. According to him, “The economic fragility could exacerbate the current political crisis.....The risk is that social expenditure will be cut which will hurt the poor” (Independent Online 2005-11-16).

53 Some people in the West have argued that perhaps some radical people in the ruling party were responsible for these repressive measures. For instance, Cedric Barnes, Horn of Africa specialist at the University of London notes, “There are people with in Zenawi’s party and his security apparatus who do have a certain amount of discretion and a lot of these people grew up at war in the bush. They are more than likely behind this reaction to dissent” (Pflanz 27 June 2005). Despite this wrong assumption, it was Meles Zenawi himself who had put (on May 15, 2005) the command of the notorious Federal Police that massacred many demonstrators under his direct command (see BBC 16 May 2005; Sudan Tribune 15 May 2005). According to some local critics, it is highly likely that the top leadership of the ruling party deliberately misinformed Western donor representatives in Addis Ababa by disseminating such wrong information in order to put the blame on the lower EPRDF officials and the Police.

54 According to The Herald (04 November 2005), “Western diplomats fear Ethiopia might be more likely to go to war again with Eritrea, its old rival, as a way to rally domestic support.”

55 For instance, although some Irish charity organizations such as GOAL requested the Irish government to cut off aid to Ethiopia due to the government’s poor human rights record, the Irish government rejected their call arguing that it chose very carefully where the money was spent. The charity organization, GOAL, according to its Chief executive, John O’Shea, wants a mechanism to channel aid through other means such as through non-governmental agencies rather than giving government-to-government support (Sudan Tribune 22 January 2006). He said, “We want to see the poor of Ethiopia benefit...We don’t want to see aid cut off but we want it channeled through other routes” (Sudan Tribune 22 January 2006).

56 According to Canmack et al (2006), after 9/11 the Bush administration defined non-democratic, fragile and poorly-governed states as threats to national security of the USA. George Bush, in his
2005 inaugural address said, "The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world….So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world" (Steele and Scott 2005: 6-7).

In reality, however, as Carothers (2007: 8) rightly pointed out, "Prime Minister Meles Zenawi is an undemocratic strongman who manipulates elections and limits political freedom in a country many hoped would move forward on democracy during this decade."

Confident in his relationship with the Bush administration, and assuming that the US would downplay the democracy issue, Meles Zenawi took the bold step in the 2005 election of expelling three major U.S. democracy promotion organizations (Carothers 2007: 8). As Meles Zenawi hoped, the Bush administration regretted these moves but continued its close relationship with Ethiopia (Carothers 2007: 8). It is also interesting to note that the US support has encouraged Meles Zenawi to use anti-terrorism slogans to silence internal opponents. The Ethiopian government accused its opponents, particularly those political groups that have been waging armed struggle such as the OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) and the ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front) as terrorist organizations (see The Economist 3 April 2008; Sudan Tribune 29 May 2008; Les nouvelles d’Addis 29 March 2006; VOA 04 April 2007; People’s Daily online 15 August 2007; MFAE 21 November 2008; McGregor 5 June 2007; Samuel 28 September 2007; BBC 15 August 2007; McLure 22 January 2008). Occasionally, the government has also been using terrorism label against the loyal opposition such as the OFDM (Oromo Federal Democratic Movement) and the OPC (Oromo People’s Congress), in spite of the fact that both parties are legally-registered parties and have seats in the federal and regional parliaments (Ethioguardian 10 November 2008; Sudan Tribune 2 December 2008; UNPO 27 November 2008). The newly established (foreign-based) G-7 party is also categorized as a terrorist organization by the Ethiopian government (BBC 6 May 2009; Reuters 5 May 2009; VOA 02 May 2009, 06 May 2009).

According to Brown (2005: 188), Western donors and international financial institutions tend to overlook Ethiopia’s democratic regression due to Meles Zenawi’s lip service for free market, and his role as a self-appointed stabilizing force in the war torn Horn of Africa. Price (2009: 161) notes that in countries “such as Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia, short-term calculations of self-interest have muted U.S. advocacy for democratic reform.” For Young (2004: 20), the Ethiopian government also played a card including opposing ‘expansionist Islam’ and counterbalancing the Sudanese regime. When that card became obsolete, Meles Zenawi drew another card i.e. the guarantor of peace in Somalia.

One of the State Department officials who were very angry on Meles Zenawi’s government was Herman Cohen, Under Secretary of State of Africa from 1989 to 1993 (i.e. in George Bush senior’s administration). Cohen requested the US president (Bush junior) to suspend aid to Ethiopia (The African Monitor 30 August 2005) due to the government’s bad human rights records.

For the first time in the history of Ethiopia, Ethiopian troops crossed their border and occupied a territory of a neighboring country. Initially, the US did not fully approve Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia and General John Abizaid, Chief of US military operations in Iraq had warned Meles Zenawi that an invasion would be disastrous and Somalia would be Ethiopia’s Iraq (BBC 1 January 2009). Despite its initial objection, the US had “provided intelligence, military targeting and logistic support to Ethiopian forces in Somalia” (BBC 1 January 2009). Though the Ethiopian government argued otherwise, Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia was disastrous. Its intervention was very costly economically, politically, and militarily. For long, Meles Zenawi was consistently rejecting the criticisms from the Ethiopian Opposition MPs and the international media. He had been telling the Ethiopian parliament that his troops’ intervention in Somalia did not affect his country’s economy (Newsweek 10 April 2008), and the death toll of Ethiopia’s troops was insignificant (see Newsweek 10 April 2008). In January 2009, however, military reverses, high death toll of Ethiopian soldiers, economic constraints (Financial Times 27 August 2008), and the changing international situations, particularly the reduction of support from the US forced him to withdraw Ethiopian troops from Somalia (Sudan Tribune 25 June 2009). Much later, he reluctantly admitted the economic impacts
of the war on Ethiopia (see Financial Times 27 August 2008), but adamantly refused to give answer on the exact number of Ethiopian deaths in Somalia (see Newsweek 10 April 2008). In one of his parliament speeches, he told the Ethiopian MPs that he had no obligation to give answer to the parliament regarding Ethiopia’s causalities and bluntly declared that the issue was not useful to the parliament (Capital March 2009; The Reporter 22 March 2009a). Ironically, according to Article 72(2) of the Constitution, the Prime Minister is accountable to the parliament: “The Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers are responsible to the House of Peoples’ Representatives”, it says. Moreover, according to Article 50(3) of the Constitution, the supreme body in the country is the parliament. It says: “The House of Peoples’ Representatives is the highest authority of the Federal Government.”

As BBC (1 January 2009) reported, Ethiopian troops withdrew from Somalia in January 2009 without having broken the power of Somalia’s Islamists. Ethiopia’s invasion radicalized the Somalis and increased the number of al-Shabaab fighters that replaced the once-powerful militia of the Islamic Courts.

In the interview with the New Internationalist (March 2004), he said Ethiopia is a country “that had no inflation, high growth, a government committed to helping the 85 percent of the population in the rural sector and to cutting back on military expenditure even though it had come into power by the gun—really quite striking.” Four or five years after Stiglitz’ testimony, however, Ethiopia found itself in the worst inflation in the country’s history. According to APA (2009-03-12), the inflation of food prices in December 2008 was 96% and in January–February 2009 it reached 104.1%.

Contrary to Joseph Stigliz’s claim, perhaps the most corrupt government in the history of Ethiopia is the government of Meles Zenawi (see Negussay 12 October 2001; Tecola 28 July 2005, 18 June 2009; Wachter 14 February 2007). As Gorfu (29 May 2009), a staunch supporter of the ruling party, reluctantly admitted in Ethiopia, “Corruption has now become rampant and almost a norm in many levels of government”. Moreover, despite the involvement of many high government and ruling party officials, only few of them such as the former Prime Minister, Tamirat Layne (see The Independent 4 February 2000; BBC 14 May 2003), and Seeeye Abhra, former defense minister (BBC 30 May 2001; ION 23-06-2001; People’s Daily online 24 July 2001) were sacked and prosecuted. According to Tesfaye (2001EC: 182-194, 226), Meles Zenawi used corruption charges only to remove his political opponents. Tesfaye (ibid) argued that despite the involvement of many other high level government officials in the corruption, Meles Zenawi decided to take actions only against his political rivals.

On the other hand, however, as Tecola Hagos (4 June 2009), the one time legal advisor of Meles Zenawi admitted, “The major public works, such as highways, dams, college and school buildings, airports and runways et cetera are schemes to move public money from the Ethiopian treasury to the private purses of companies controlled by Meles Zenawi and his group, who become contractors, sub contractors and suppliers to all such projects.”

In his congratulatory speech, Yara’s president Thorleif Enger appreciated Meles Zenawi. He said, “The prize is recognition of past accomplishments and encouragement to achieve economic development for the people of Ethiopia. History will prove if the winner is a worthy recipient. We are willing to take that chance.” Jeffrey Sachs also gave a similar remark during the occasion. “It is richly deserved as Ethiopia has given much to the World and deserves our support. Like many African nations, it is at a precarious crossroads we have to help them choose the right path. With our support Ethiopia can lift itself from poverty and hunger. Under Prime Minister Meles the country has created the grass roots structure to enable this to happen.” (see “First Yara Prize awarded to Meles Zenawi.”<http:// Yara.com> )

Ironically, the Yara prize was awarded to Meles Zenawi just two months after his party rigged the election and his troops massacred many anti-government demonstrators in the June 2005 crisis. Exactly two months after he received the Yara prize, his troops once again massacred many pro-Opposition demonstrators in the November 2005 post-election riot (see Negussay 2 September 2005).

It is interesting to note that one month earlier (i.e. on 23 March 2009) Dr. Gregory Stanton, President of Genocide Watch, submitted a proposal to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Justice Navanathem Pillay, requesting the initiation of an investigation on Meles Zenawi on
his alleged role on the genocidal massacre of the Anuak people in Gambella and the Amhara people in various areas (see Genocide Watch 23 March 2009; VOA 15 April 2009). Moreover, the Amnesty international and the Human Rights Watch had accused Meles Zenawi’s government of genocide against ethnic Somalis in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and war crimes in the neighbouring country, Somalia (The Economist 5 February 2009). The European Union had also declared its intention to investigate the alleged war crimes committed by Meles Zenawi’s government in Somalia (Reuters 6 April 2007).

Dismayed by Meles Zenawi’s participation in the G-20 meeting many Diaspora Ethiopians and various political groups used the opportunity to oppose Meles Zenawi’s anti-democratic practices. The supporters of various political organizations including the TPLF’s former allies namely, the OLF and the ONLF held demonstrations in London and denounced his government. Perhaps embarrassed by the demonstrations, Meles Zenawi abruptly cancelled his press briefing at the end of the conference. According to Henry Gombya of The Black Star News (2 April 2009), Prime Minister Meles Zenawi decided to abruptly cancel his press conference at the G-20 meeting to avoid questions on human rights in Ethiopia and his unsuccessful intervention in Somalia.

Moreover, the incumbent party controls many multi-billion business organizations under the umbrella corporation called EFFORT (Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray). According to Shinn and Ofcansky (2004), the EFFORT was established in August 1995 as an umbrella organization for companies operated by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and operates as a public endowment. The main companies include Addis Pharmaceuticals, Guna Trading Company, Hiwot Agricultural Mechanization, Mega Advertising Enterprise, Radio Fana, Trans-Ethiopia Company etc. The top officials of the EFFORT are prominent government officials and TPLF party executives such as Seyoum Mesfin (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Sebhat Nega (Shinn and Ofcansky 2004: 137). For Prendergast and Duffield (1998: 46), the EFFORT is a: “Non-government-owned enterprises controlled through majority shareholding by members of the TPLF and to a lesser extent by other EPRDF-affiliated parties, particularly the OPDO and the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM)……….. EFFORT obtained large blocks of shares in numerous key companies formed by leading by TPLF members. Profits end up under the control of the EPRDF members. These companies represent what is likely the largest concentration of capital and assets within Ethiopia.” Recently, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has appointed his wife to be in charge of this business empire (Tecola 4 June 2009; Addis Fortune 03-30-2009).

Similarly, the prime minister vowed to spread internet services to the entire country in three years time (AP 04-05-05). “We plan to ensure universal access and internet connectivity to all the tens of thousands of rural kebels (districts) of our country over the next two to three years”, he said. According to the plan, by 2007 all Ethiopians would live not more than a few kilometres from broadband access point (The Guardian 14 August 2005). At present, however, internet development in Ethiopia is the lowest in Africa. According to ITU (2009: 91), the proportion of households with Internet in Ethiopia is 0.1%; mobile cellular subscription per 1000 inhabitants is 1.5; fixed telephone with computer is 0.2. Moreover, Internet user per 100 inhabitants is 0.4 (ITU 2009: 93).

To be honest, China is not the first country to use aid as a tool to advance its national interests abroad (Naim 2007). As I have already discussed, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States were giving economic aid to dictators in exchange for their loyalty.

It is ironic that Ethiopia itself has in its Constitution an article (no.39) that gives its states (regions) the right to secession.


The Ethiopian government has been using this Chinese technology to tap telephones, block the Websites of opposition parties, independent media, and human rights organizations (see CPJ 29 August 2008; EMF 15 May 2009; Reuters 01 May 2007; RSF 29 May 2006; 23-05-2006; VOA 24 May 2006; US Department of State 25 February 2009).
Recently, however, the UN has decided to prosecute the Sudanese leader for his possible involvement in the genocide (The New York Times 5 March 2009). According to The New York Times (5 March 2009), and Las Vegas Sun (5 March 2009), the other considered possible targets of the Court in Africa are the leaders of Zimbabwe, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad, Ivory Coast, Rwanda and Central African Republic.

In Ethiopia, for instance, as testified by many Western media, due to the Chinese support there are visible signs of infrastructural development in the country compared to the country’s situation in the previous regimes. However, despite this “progress” Ethiopians have found themselves in the worst form of poverty in the country’s history.

Some Western scholars have wrongly credited Meles Zenawi for averting the danger of Ethiopia’s disintegration in 1991. For instance, Cedric Barnes, Horn of Africa specialist at the University of London, claims, “While there are problems with Ethiopia’s human rights record, and cronyism which means economic benefits don’t always go to everyone, Zenawi deserves credit for holding the whole thing together and making at least some progress” (Pflanz 27 June 2005). On the other hand, many scholars argue that it is the policy of Meles Zenawi, particularly his policy of ethnic federalism that encouraged secession and put the country in a very dangerous situation (see Wondwosen and Zahorik 2008: 1-39). As a secessionist rebel front since 1970s (see TPLF’s 1976 Manifesto and Aregawi 2004: 591), it was the TPLF that fought against the unity forces in the country such as the EPRP (Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Party), EDU (Ethiopian Democratic Union) and the central Ethiopian government. The original plan of the TPLF was to separate Tigray from the rest of Ethiopia by allying itself with another secessionist force in Eritrea, EPLF. However, the rapid and unexpected fall of the central Ethiopian government in 1991 following the collapse of the Socialist system at the end of the Cold War, and the realization that Tigray has been one of the poorest regions in Ethiopia forced the TPLF to temporarily defer its plan of secession.

There is a widespread belief in Ethiopia that the TPLF, which became a ruling party in 1991, decided to rule the country until it strengthens the Tigray region economically and militarily. Moreover, in order to weaken the pro-unity forces in the country, the TPLF-EPRDF government forcefully divided the country along ethnic lines and included Article 39 (in the constitution) that allows the newly structured regions (States) the right to secession. Contrary to the assumption of the Western scholars, the TPLF government, which is dominated by ethnic Tigreans (Wrong 14 November 2005; McLure 22 June 2009; Howden 28 June 2009), has never believed in the Ethiopian unity, and its ultimate goal is the creation of an independent Tigray. However, due to various protracted factors TPLF is still not in a position to secede Tigray. Despite ruling the whole of Ethiopia for the last 20 years, still the ruling TPLF party is unable to implement its original plan of secession. The first obstacle for the secession of Tigray at present is the conflict between the TPLF and EPLF. The former alliance between the TPLF and the EPLF broke down due to their economic, border and personal conflicts and the two former comrade-in-arms fought a bloody war in 1998-2000. Therefore, the TPLF leadership realized that as long as the current Eritrean regime led by Isaias Afeworki is in power, it is highly unlikely that Eritrea would support the creation of an independent Tigray. (In his interview held in Asmara in June 2009 with Elias Kifle, the editor of The Ethiopian Review, Isaias Afeworki, the Eritrean President, ridiculed the prospect of the secession of Tigray, and the ethnic federalism policy of the TPLF). The second factor is the gradual diminishing interest of the ethnic Tigreans for secession. At present, the secession of Tigray is no more the priority for many TPLF members, unlike the 1970s where secession was the top agenda of the party. This shift was caused by various reasons. Currently, many of the TPLF combatants have become top federal government officials and the ethnic Tigreans have controlled most of the country’s economic and political resources in spite of the fact that ethnic Tigreans represent only 6% of the total Ethiopian population (McLure 22 June 2009). Therefore, these days, most of the ethnic Tigreans want the status quo, and are not ready for secession. Furthermore, many secessionist organizations including the TPLF and OLF have realized that contrary to their expectation, secession by itself does not bring a magical solution to their economic and political
problems. The realization of the economic problems of the newly-independent Eritrea has given them a lesson that breaking away from the rest of Ethiopia would aggravate their economic woes. It is also interesting to note that almost all secessionist parties including the OLF and TPLF are losing ground and support not only in the rest of Ethiopia but also in their own particular regions. For many ethnic Tigreans, the TPLF died a political death in 2001 when the Meles-led group expelled the party’s former prominent leaders such as Seeye Abraha, Gebru Asrat, Tewolde Woldemariam, Alemseged Gebreamlak and others. Moreover, the mysterious assassinations of the party’s charismatic leaders like Hailom Araya and Kinfe Gebremedhin, to a certain extent, have weakened the blind loyalty of many Tigrean to the TPLF. At present, former high ranking TPLF officials such as Gebru Asrat and Aregash Adane have joined pro-unity opposition forces in the country.

Since 1991, many top officials of the ruling party have been repeatedly threatening that if attempts are made to change the current constitution, the TPLF would re-start its guerrilla war in the country. In his interview in the Ethiopian Forum for Political Civility (Ethio-Civility Pal Talk) on 28 May 2007, Sebhat Nega, one of the architects of the ruling TPLF party and the so-called “Father of Tigray”, openly declared that Ethiopia would disintegrate if the opposition parties attempted to change the existing constitution. (In this case, by implication, it means that even if opposition parties win election constitutionally, they will not have any right to change or modify the TPLF authored constitution). It is interesting to note that in their political program most of the legally-registered non-ethnic parties such as the AEUP have declared that they would change some articles such as Article 39 from the Constitution if they were elected. It is a foregone conclusion that the ruling party would use the Tigrean-dominated army and the Police against the people in case of election defeats as witnessed in the 2005 election. In this kind of situation, it is not surprising if local critics question the significance of having election every five years!

Meles Zenawi argues that Ethiopia was created by force and the various ethnic groups were forced to be parts of Ethiopia by the former “Amhara ruling class” (The New York Times 29 May 1991). According to him, the inclusion of Article 39 in the constitution gives the various “nationalities, nations and peoples” in the country the guarantee that whenever they felt their rights and freedom are violated, they could secede from the federation by invoking the said article. (To understand why Zenawi’s government imposed ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, see Wondwosen and Záhořík 2008).

It is interesting to note that not to antagonize the ruling TPLF-EPRDF party the embassies of the Western donors in Addis Ababa have been reluctant to have consultations with the pan-Ethiopian and non-ethnic parties. One of the pan-Ethiopian parties that became the victim of such policy is the AEUP (All-Ethiopian Union Party) whose leader, Hailu Shawel, is wrongly being portrayed as an Amhara hard-liner. Many times, the diplomats and other government officials of Western donors fail to include the AEUP in their discussions with Ethiopian opposition parties in spite of the fact that the party is the largest and the most influential opposition party in the country (KAEUP 26 March 2009; VEDR 6 December 2008). Recently, however, due to the intensive lobbying efforts of the AEUP Diaspora support groups in the United States and to quash the wild speculations on the issue, the US embassy political advisor in Addis Ababa held a discussion with the AEUP’s chairman (AEUP 20 February 2009), which soon sparked a controversy forcing the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to release a scathing remark against the US in its weekly press release (see The Reporter 11 March 2009; EMFA 6-3-2009).

The donors’ attitude towards the Opposition is largely influenced by the ruling party, which has sufficient experience in defaming or undermining the opposition parties, particularly the pan-Ethiopian political groups. As I have mentioned earlier, prior to the 2005 election, the donors were reluctant to have consultations with the opposition groups and as the result they did not have clear and sufficient information concerning their economic and political programs. For instance, the German specialists working in various projects in Ethiopia were worried due to the electoral defeats of Arkebe Equbai and other candidates of the ruling party in the Addis Ababa city government,
which was closely collaborating with GTZ. According to the German-foreign-policy.com (2005-05-18), the regional manager of the German state-owned GTZ (gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit) (“Association for technical cooperation”) said, “It is difficult to judge the economic intentions of the opposition, who, in some areas won ‘landslide victories’ because of ‘insufficient previous observation’.” According to Wondwosen (2008a: 780-809), the government’s policy of ethnic federalism has created an ample situation for the establishment of ethnic-based parties at the expense of the pan-Ethiopian and non-ethnic parties.

The TPLF-EPDF government has been attempting to weaken the opposition parties (particularly non-ethnic or pan-Ethiopian parties) in various ways. These include: by encouraging dissent among their ranks; by harassing, intimidating and imprisoning their leaders and members etc. Moreover, by manipulating the courts and the NEBE (National Electoral Board of Ethiopia) the ruling party gives a legal cover to its actions (see Wondwosen 2009d: 60-68).

Many non-ethnic parties such as the EPRP, which have been strong rivals of the TPLF since the 1970s, and other unity parties such as MEISON are excluded from the country’s political scene by the ruling party (Merera 2003: 87-88, 161) in order to frustrate their mobilizing capacity. The principal precondition to participate in the Ethiopian political scene, according to the TPLF-EPDF, is renouncing armed struggle, accepting the constitution, and stopping any attempt to remove the government by force (Wondwosen 2008a: 780-809).

According to Berhanu (1998EC:385-386) and Gebru Asrat (20 September 2008), the incumbent party was defeated in the 2005 election. However, it was declared “winner” by rigging the election (Newsweek 20 April 2009).

There are two major misconceptions regarding the CUD. As reported by the BBC (23 July 2007), there is an assumption that the CUD’s major supporters in the 2005 election were the Amhara people. Though it is true that the CUD got important electoral victories in the Amhara region, its strong base was Addis Ababa, the capital city, whose residents are ethnically diverse. In Addis Ababa, the CUD got almost 100 % electoral victory. Secondly, as pointed out by Abbink (2006: 173-179), it was wrongly assumed that the CUD was largely supported by the so-called “chauvinist” Amhara elements. In reality, however, CUD’s support came from various population groups and regions, particularly from Addis Ababa, SNNPR (Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region), and Amhara region.

Many people in Ethiopia believe that the courts are kangaroo courts, filled by puppet judges who graduated from the EPRDF-controlled Civil Service College (see The Reporter 17 June 2009). In the last 19 years, the country has witnessed a spate of political show trials staged against opposition leaders, civil society leaders, and journalists of the independent media.

In the present-day Ethiopia, as clearly observed in the 2005 post-election crises, “genocide” and “treason “charges against opposition parties, civil society leaders, and journalists of the independent media have become the major tools of the government to smash dissident voices (see BBC 9 April 2007, 17 December 2005; VOA 22 March 2006; Reuters 9 April 2007; People’s Daily online 17 December 2007; The Independent 3 May 2006).

During a negotiation to end the 2005 post-election crises, Meles Zenawi explicitly told the Opposition leaders that if they expect to run the country they should follow his guerrilla route and go in to the bush (see Wrong 14 November 2005). (Ironically, Meles passed his message in the presence of the then EU Commission representative, Timothy Clarke, who facilitated the discussion between the Prime Minister and the leaders of the two largest Opposition coalitions, Dr. Berhanu Nega and Prof. Beyene Petros (see Berhanu 1998EC:435-436). Prime Minister Meles Zenawi also told Timothy Clarke that if Western donors oppose his government’s actions against the Opposition, “They can leave the country with their money” (see Berhanu 1998EC: 435-436).

The Ethiopian government strongly criticized the aid-cut plan of the donor countries after the 2005 electoral conflicts. For instance, Sufyan Ahmed, the country’s Finance Minister, objected the aid-cut plan on the ground that it would affect the country’s poor. Pointing out that the direct budgetary support would make up around 10% of Ethiopia’s budget, he said, “The impact should be
insignificant although it is the poor who will be affected.” He also accused the donors of misunderstanding the real problems in the country: “Either they have misunderstood what is going on in the country or they are under pressure from certain groups—I don’t know…..We feel this is an unacceptable decision, but it is their prerogative” (IRIN 30 December 2005).

90 Diamond (1997: 32) criticized the hypocrisy of Western donors as follows: “For Africa, a lower standard is set by the major Western powers: opposition parties that can contest for office, even if they are to be manipulated, hounded, and blatantly rigged into defeat at election time.”

91 In Sub-Saharan Africa, the only countries that are moving to a clear form of consolidated democracy are South Africa, Botswana and Mauritius (Rakner and Menocal 2007: 17). According to some researchers, other African countries such as Tanzania (Lawson and Rakner 2005; Kelsall 2003), Ghana (Gyimah-Boadi 2001; Lindberg 2003), and Mozambique (Manning 2005) should be put in the category of consolidating democracies though the findings of the authors are being challenged.

Freedom House democracy indices (Siegle 2007: 3) categorized African political regimes in 2007 in four groups: Consolidating democracies, democratizers, semi-authoritarians, and autocracies.

**Consolidating Democracies** are Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Namibia, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, and South Africa.

**Democratizers** are Burundi, Comoros, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.

**Semi-Authoritarians** are Angola, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Rep, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Rwanda, Togo

**Autocracies** are Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe.

92 In fact, since the second half of the 1990s as Harbeson (1999: 52-53) claimed, Ethiopia has become a ‘de facto single-party’ state. Moreover, according to The Independent (10 June 2005), “The prime minister, Meles Zenawi, appeared to lean to the West, but has failed to deliver either democracy or stable and growing economy. The government’s panicked response to opposition protests in the wake of the election is reminiscent of recent developments in Central Asia.”

93 Emboldened by the Western donors’ support in the 2005 post-election crises, the EPRDF government recently introduced new repressive proclamations to fully control the independent media (Wondwosen 2009b: 84-112), and civil society organizations (Wondwosen 2009a: 80-95).

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